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CHAPTER ill 
THE EMPLOYMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 
A. INTRODUCTORY 
From the days when the Romans first came to appreciate the 
economic value of prisoners .of war as a source of labor, and began 
to use them as slaves instead of killing them on the field of battlel 
until the drafting and adoption by a comparatively large number of 
members of the then family of sovereign States of the Second Hague 
Convention of 1899, no attempt to regulate internationally the use 
of prisoner-of-war labor by the Detaining Power had been success-
fuP The Regulations attached to that Convention dealt with the sub-
ject in a single article, as did the Regulations attached to the Fourth 
Hague Convention of 1907 which, with relatively minor exceptions, 
merely repeated the provisions of its predecessor. A somewhat more 
extensive elaboration of the subject was included in the 1929 Con-
vention; and, although still far from perfect, the provisions concern-
ing prisoner-of-war labor in the 1949 Convention certainly constitute 
an enlightened attempt to legislate a fairly comprehensive code gov-
erning the major problems involved in the employment of prisoners 
of war by the Detaining Power.3 The purpose of this chapter will be 
to analyze the provisions of that labor code and to suggest not only 
how the draftsmen intended them to be interpreted, but also to at-
tempt to prognosticate what can be expected in actual,implementation 
by Detaining Powers generally in any future major international 
armed conflict. 
B. HISTORICAL 
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the labor provisions of 
the 1949 Convention, and how one may anticipate that they will 
operate in time of such armed conflict, it is both pertinent and ap-
propriate to survey briefly the history of, and the problems encoun-
tered in, the utilization of prisoner-of-war labor during and since the 
1 See pp. 2-3 supra. 
:l Although, as we shall see, the subject of prisoner-of-war labor has been dealt 
with by Article 76 of Lieber's Code, Article 25 of the Declaration of Brussels, and 
in Articles 71-72 of the Oxford Manual of 1880, and while these efforts unques-
tionably influenced in material degree the decisions subsequently reached at The 
Hague, none of them constituted actual international legislation. 
3 Pictet, Recuel 91. 
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American Civil War (1861-65). That period is selected because it 
represents the point at which cartels for the exchange of prisoners 
of war ceased to have any considerable impact and yet belligerents 
were apparently still largely unaware of the tremendous potential of 
the economic asset which was available to them at a time of urgent 
need. 
The American Civil War was the first major conflict involving large 
masses of troops and large numbers of prisoners of war in which 
exchanges were the exception rather than the rule.4 As a result, both 
sides found themselves encumbered with great masses of prisoners of 
war; but neither side made any substantial use of its large pool of 
manpower, although both suffered from labor shortages.u This was 
so despite the fact that Article 76 of Lieber's Code specifically stated 
it to be a rule of international law that prisoners of war "may be 
required to work for the benefit of the captor's government, according 
to their rank and condition"; and despite the valiant efforts of the 
Quartermaster General of the Union army, who sought unsuccessfully, 
although fully supported by Professor Lieber, to overcome the official 
reluctance to use prisoner-of-war labor. The policy of the Federal 
Government was that prisoners of war would be compelled to work 
"only as an instrument of reprisal against some act of the enemy."6 
It will be recalled that in 1874 an international conference, which 
included representatives from most of the leading European nations, 
met in Brussels "in order to deliberate on the draft of an international 
agreement respecting the laws and customs of war."7 This conference 
prepared the text which, while never ratified, constituted a major 
step forward in the effort to set down in definitive manner those rules 
of land warfare which could be considered to be part of the customary 
law of nations. It included, in its Article 25, a provision concerning 
prisoner-of-war labor which adopted, but considerably amplified, Lie-
ber's single sentence on the subject quoted above. The Article con-
tained in the Declaration was, in turn, subsequently adopted almost 
verbatim in the Oxford Manual in 1880; and it furnished much of 
the material for Article 6 of the 1899 Hague Regulations and for the 
same Article in the 1907 Hague RegUlations. 
Despite all of these attempts and eventual successes in the effort 
to codify the law with respect to prisoner-of-war labor, the actual 
utilization of such labor remained negligible during the numerous 
4 See pp. 7-8 supra. 
;; Lewis & Mewha 27 & 41. For a vivid fictional, but factually accurate, picture 
of this waste of manpower in the South, with its resulting evils to the prisoners 
of war themselves, see Kantor, Andersonville. 
6 Lewis & Mewha 37. These same authors state that "in the Civil War both sides 
were crippled by a shortage of manpower, yet both sides overlooked the vast labor 
'Pool offered by idle prisoners of war." Ibid., 41. 
7 Final Protocol of the Brussels Conference of 1874. See p. 8 supra. 
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armed conflicts which preceded World War 1. This last was really the 
first modern international armed conflict in which there was total 
economic mobilization by the belligerents; and there were more men 
held as prisoners of war and for longer periods of time than during 
any previous conflict. Nevertheless, it was not until 1916 that the 
British War Office could overcome opposition in the United Kingdom 
to the use of prisoner-of-war labor;8 and after the entry of the United 
States into that conflict, prisoners of war held by it were not usefully 
employed until the investigation of an attempted mass escape resulted 
in a recommendation for a program of compulsory prisoner-of-war 
labor in part as a means of reducing disciplinary problems.9 When the 
belligerents eventually did find it essential to make use of the tremen-
dous prisoner-of-war manpower pools which were so readily available 
to them, the provisions of the 1907 Hague Regulations covering this 
subject proved completely inadequate to solve the numerous problems 
which arose, thereby necessitating the negotiation of a series of bilat-
eral and multilateral agreements between the various belligerents 
during the course of hostilities.10 Even so, the Report of the "Com-
mission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on 
Enforcement of Penalties," created by the Preliminary Peace Confer-
ence in January 1919, listed the "[e]mployment of prisoners of war 
on unauthorized works" as one of the offenses which had been com-
mitted by the Central Powers during the war.ll 
The inadequacies of the 1907 Hague Regulations in this and other 
areas, revealed by the events which had occurred during World War l, 
led to the drafting and ratification of the 1929 Convention.12 It was 
8 Belfield, Treatment 137. At that same time 75 percent (1,20Q,000 out of 1,600,-
000) of the prisoners of war in Germany were already employed. McCarthy, Pris-
oner of War 141; Vizzard, Policy 240. 
9 Lewis & Mewha 57 and source cited therein. This was not the case in France, 
where the American Expeditionary Force had started planning for prisoner-of-
war utilization even before they were captured, the established policy of that com-
mand being that all except commissioned officers would be compelled to work. 
Ibid., 59-62. (In Barker, Behind Barbed Wire 97, the present author is credited 
with having stated that the recommendation made in the United States was that 
prisoner-of-war labor be used as a disciplinary measure. Quite the contrary! It 
was recommended as a means of keeping the prisoners of war occupied in order 
to reduce disciplinary problems.) 
10 All of the bilateral and multilaterial agreements cited in note 1-39 supra, had 
provisions concerning prisoner-of-war labor. The 1918 United States-German 
Agreement had a section of 11 articles (41-51) dealing solely with this subject 
For a discussion of the problems which arose with respect to the negotiations of 
these provisions, see Stone, The American-German Conference on Prisoners of 
War, 13 A.J.I.L. 406, 424-28. 
1114 A.J.I.L. 95, 115 (1920); UNWCC History 35. 
12 The International Law Association's Proposed International Regulations, 
note 1-40 supra, had a number of provisions in its Article 10 regulating prisoner-
of-war labor. 
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this Convention which governed most of the belligerents during the 
course of World War II;13 but once again international legislation 
based on the experience gained during a previous conflict proved in-
adequate to control the more serious and complicated situations which 
arose during a subsequent period of hostilities.H Moreover, the proper 
implementation of any agreement the provisions of which require 
interpretation must obviously depend in large part upon the good faith 
of the parties thereto-and as belligerents in war are, perhaps under-
standably, not motivated to be unduly generous to their adversaries, 
decisions are sometimes made and policies are sometimes adopted 
which either skirt the bounds of legal propriety or, perhaps, arguably 
exceed such bounds. The utilization of prisoner-of-war labor by the 
Detaining Powers proved no exception to the foregoing. Practically 
all prisoners of war were compelled to work. Hi To this there can be 
basically no objection. But during the course of their employment many 
of the protective provisions of the 1929 Convention (and of the 1907 
Hague Regulations which it complemented) were either grossly dis-
torted or simply disregarded. 
The leaders of Hitler's Nazi Germany were aware of its shortage 
of manpower during World War II and appreciated the importance 
of the additional pool of labor afforded by prisoners of war as a source 
of that precious wartime commodity. Nevertheless, for a considerable 
period of time they permitted their ideological differences with the 
Communists to override their common sense and urgent needs. III And 
13 As the Soviet Union was not a party to this Convention, it considered that 
its relations with Germany and the latter's allies on prisoner-of-war matters were 
governed by the 1907 Hague Regulations. 1 ICRC Report 412. (No mention was 
made by the Soviet Union of the situation created by the si omnes clause contain-
ed in the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907.) Japan, which was likewise not a 
party to the 1929 Convention, nevertheless announced its intention to apply that 
Convention, mutatis mtttandis, on a basis of reciprocity. Ibid., 443. 
14 "The international instruments regUlating the treatment of prisoners of war 
were drawn up on the basis of the experience gained in the war of 1914-18 and 
did not contemplate the wholesale and systematic use which many countries have 
since made of captive labor." Anon., Conditions of Employment 169. 
15 In February 1944, only 60 percent of the prisoners of war in the United 
States were being employed; by April 1945, that figure exceeded 90 percent. Lew-
is & Mewha 125. In Germany "[t]he mobilisation of prisoner labour [had] been 
organised as part of the general mobilisation of man-power for the execution of 
the economic programme .... " Anon., Employment in Germany 318. It has been 
estimated that by February 1944, the 2,500,000 working prisoners of war repre-
sented 8 percent of the German labor force. Vizzard, Policy 262. 
16 Thus, it has been stated that the improved feeding of Russian prisoners of 
war by the Germans in 1942 was instituted in order to obtain an adequate labor 
performance, and "must be assessed as a tactical sacrifice of dogma for the sake 
of short-range benefits to the warring Reich." D?llin, German Rule 423. In the 
Milch Case, 2 T.W.C. at 782, the Military Tribunal quoted a 1943 statement of 
Himmler who, in speaking of the Russian prisoners of war captured early in the 
217 
in Japan, which, although not a party to the 1929 Convention, had 
committed itself to apply its provisions, those relating to prisoner-of-
war labor were among the many which were assiduously violated.17 
Like all of the other belligerents during World War II, the United 
States found an urgent need for prisoner-of-war labor, both within 
its home territory and in the rear areas of the embattled continents. 
One study even goes so far as to assert that the use of the labor of 
the Italian prisoners of war in the Mediterranean theater was the 
only thing which made it possible for the United States to sustain 
simultaneously both the Italian campaign and the invasion of South-
ern France, thereby hastening the downfall of Germany.1S Similarly, 
it was found that in the United States the use of prisoners of war 
for work at military installations, and in agriculture and other au-
thorized industries, served to release both army service troops and 
civilians for other types of work which were more directly related 
to the war effort.19 
While the benefits of prisoner-of-war labor to the Detaining Power 
are patent, benefits flowing to the prisoners of war themselves as a 
result of their use in this manner are no less apparent. The reciprocal 
benefits resulting from the proper use of prisoner-of-war labor are 
well summarized in the following statement: 
The work done by the PW has a high value for the Detaining 
Power, since it makes a substantial contribution to its economic 
resources. The PW's home country has to reckon that the work 
so done increases the war potential of its enemy, maybe indi-
rectly: and yet at the same time it is to its own profit that its 
nationals should return home at the end of hostilities in the best 
possible state of health. Work under normal conditions is a valu-
able antidote to the trials of captivity, and helps PW to preserve 
their bodily health and morale.20 
conflict, a very large number of whom did not survive their first winter of cap-
tivity, deplored the fact that at that time the Germans "did not value the mass 
of humanity as we value it today, as raw material, as labor." 
17 The I.M.T.F.E. stated (at 1082) that U[t]he policy of the Japanese Govern-
ment was to use prisoners of war and civilian internees to do work directly relat-
ed to war operations." See also, Trial of Tanabe Koshiro; Vizzard, Policy 259, & 
263. 
18 Lewis & Mewha 199. 
Itl Fairchild & Grossman 194. 
201 ICRC Report 327. See also, Pictet Commentary 260; Flory, Prisoners of 
ll'al· 71; Girard-Claudon, Les prisonniers de guerre en face de l'evolution de la 
guerre 151, Feilchenfeld, P)·woners of War 47; PMG Review, UI-372. Article 49 
of the 1949 Convention specifically states that the utilization of prisoners-of-war 
labor is "with a vie;\' particularly to maintaining them in a good state of physical 
and mental health." And, of course, the working pay which a prisoner of war 
will receive for his labor will frequently permit him to acquire extra items which 
would otherwise be beyond his reach. 
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During the close reappraisal of the 1929 Convention which followed 
World War II, the provisions thereof dealing with the subject of pris-
oner-of-war labor were not overlooked; and the conferences which 
culminated in the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, as well as that Con-
ference itself, redrafted many of those provisions of the 1929 Con-
vention in an effort to plug the loopholes which the events of World 
War II had revealed. While there are obvious differences between the 
employment of workers available through a free labor market and 
the employment of prisoners of war, even a casual and cursory study 
will quickly disclose a remarkable number of similarities. The labor 
union which is engaged in negotiating a contract for its members 
with their employer is vitally interested in: (1) the conditions under 
which they will work, including safety provisions; (2) working hours 
and the holidays and vacations to which they will be entitled; (3) the 
compensation and other monetary benefits which they will receive; 
and (4) the grievance procedures which will be available to them. 
Because of the uniqueness of prisoner-of-war status, the 1949 Diplo-
matic Conference felt it necessary, in drafting provisions for the bene-
fit and protection of future prisoners of war, to continue to provide 
guidance with respect to certain types of problems in addition to those 
mentioned above, such as the categories of prisoners of war who may 
be compelled to work (a problem which does not normally exist for 
labor unions operating in a free civilian society, although it may come 
into existence to some extent in a total war economy) ; and, collateral 
to that, the specific industries in which they mayor may not be em-
ployed. ~nasmuch as these two latter problems lie at the threshold of 
the utilization of prisoner-of-war labor, they will be considered before 
those enumerated above. 
C. CATEGORIES OF PRISONERS OF WAR WHO MAY BE 
COMPELLED TO WORK 
In general, Article 49 of the 1949 Convention provides that all 
prisoners of war, except commissioned officers, may be compelled to 
work. However, this statement requires considerable elaboration and 
is subj ect to a number of limitations. 
1. Physical Fitness 
Under the first paragraph of Article 49 only those prisoners of war 
who are physically fit may be compelled to work by the Detaining 
Power; and the work which they are called upon to perform must 
be of a nature to maintain them "in a good state of physical and men-
tal health." In determining physical fitness, it is prescribed that the 
Detaining Power must take into account the age, sex, and physical 
aptitude of each prisoner of war as an individual. It may be assumed 
that these criteria are to be considered not only in determining wheth-
er a prisoner of war should be compelled to work, but also in deter-
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mining the type of work to which the particular prisoner of war 
should be assigned. For example, older prisoners of war should not 
be assigned to types of work which require great and constant exer-
tion; women prisoners of war should not be assigned to tasks requir-
ing the lifting and moving of heavy loads, tasks which may be beyond 
their physical capabilities; and male prisoners of war, although phys-
ically fit to work, may not have the physical aptitude for certain jobs 
by reason of their size, weight, strength, lack of experience, etc.21 It 
would appear that the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 49 
of the 1949 Convention require the Detaining Power to assure the 
assignment of the right man, from the physical point of view, to the 
right job. 
Under the provisions of Article 31 and the first paragraph of Ar-
ticle 55 of the 1949 Convention, the determination of physical fitness 
must be made by medical personnel and at regular monthly intervals. 
It should be noted that the first of the cited articles if a general one 
which requires the Detaining Power to conduct thorough "medical 
inspections," monthly at a minimum, primarily in order to supervise 
the general state of health of all prisoners of war and to detect con-
tagious diseases ;22 while the second, which caBs for a "medical ex-
amination" at least monthly, is intended to verify the physical fitness 
of the prisoner of war for work, and particularly for the work to 
which he is assigned.23 It is evident that one medical examination 
directed simultaneously toward both objectives would meet the dual 
21 During World War II the German use as miners' of prisoners of war who did 
not have the necessary physical aptitude for this type of work and who were in-
experienced was a constant source of dispute. The lCRC delegate in Berlin finally 
proposed to the German High Command that prisoners of war over 45 years of 
age be exempted from working as miners, but this proposal was rejected by the 
Germans on the ground that the 1929 Convention made no reference to age as a 
criterion of physical qualification for compulsory labor. 1 lCRC Report 329-31. 
This situation has now been rectified. 
22 See pp. 133-139 supra. 
23 The procedures followed in the United States during World War II were as 
follows: "Prisoners of war ... are given a complete physical examination upon their 
first arrival at a prisoner of war camp. At least once a month thereafter, they are 
inspected by a medical officer. Prisoners are classified by the attending medi-
cal officer according to their ability to work, as follows: (a) heavy work; (b) 
light work; (c) sick, or otherwise incapacitated-no work. Employable prisoners 
perform work only when the job is commensurate with their physical condition." 
McKnight, POW Employment 64. The quoted statement was based, at least in 
part, on POW Circular No.1, para. 87, which was, in turn, taken from Article 
48 of the 1918 United States-German Agreement. 
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obligations thus imposed upon the Detaining Power.24 
The provisions of the second paragraph of Article 55, authorizing 
a prisoner of war to appear before the camp medical authorities when-
ever he considers himself incapable of working, is undoubtedly essen-
tial, but it has grave potentialities. Certainly, if a prisoner of war 
does not feel capable of working he should be given an opportunity to 
have his condition verified by the medical authorities, not only so 
that, if medically appropriate, he may be excused from working, but 
also so that he may receive the medical treatment to which he is en-
titled under the first paragraph of Article 30.25 However, it can be 
anticipated that well-organized prisoners of war, intent upon creating 
as many difficulties as possible for the Detaining Power, will sometimes 
be directed by their anonymous leaders to report themselves en masse 
and at frequent intervals as being incapable of working and to request 
that they be pe:rmitted to appear before the medical authorities of the 
camp. Is the Detaining Power to be helpless if thousands of prisoners 
of war, many more than can be examined by available medical per-
sonnel, all suddenly elect to claim physical unfitness for work and to 
demand the right to appear before the medical authorities? Where the 
Detaining Power has good grounds for believing that such is the 
situation, and this will normally be quite apparent, it would undoubt-
edly be fully justified in compelling every prisoner of war to work 
until his turn to appear before the medical authorities was reached 
in regular order with the complement of medical personnel which 
had previously been adequate for that particular prisoner-of-war 
camp. Thus, the act of the prisoners of war themselves in attempting 
to turn a provision intended for their protection into an offensive 
weapon, illegal in its very inception, would actually result in the caus-
ing of harm to the very people whom it was intended to protect-the 
truly ailing and physically unfit prisoners of war. If such a procedure 
is followed by the Detaining Power, the use of the provisions of the 
second paragraph of Article 55 and the penultimate paragraph of 
Article 30 will quickly revert to that for which they were intended. 
The suggestion has been made that the medical examinations to 
determine physical fitness for work should preferably be made by the 
retained medical personnel of the Power of Origin.2G This suggestion 
24 Article 31 speaks of "medical inspections," while the first paragraph of Arti-
cle 55 uses the term "medical examinations." (A similar variance is found in th(! 
French version of the 1949 Convention.) It does not appear that any substantive 
difference was intended, particularly inasmuch as Article 31 considerably ampli-
fies the term "inspection," making it quite clear that much more than a mere 
visual inspection was intended. 
25 See p. 134 supra. The second paragraph of Article 55 parallels the gen-
eral provision contained in the first sentence of Article 30. 
26 Pictet, Commentary 212 & 289. For a discussion of "retained medical person-
nel," see pp. 70-74 supra. ' 
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is apparently based upon the fact that the third paragraph of Article 
30, in providing for the general medical care and treatment of pris-
oners of war, states that they "shall have the attention, preferably, of 
medical personnel of the Power on which they depend and, if possible, 
of their nationality." However, there is considerable difference be-
tween assigning the medical personnel of the Power of Origin to 
render medical care and treatment to a fellow prisoner of war who is 
ill or injured, and permitting such personnel to say whether or not 
the prisoner of war is physically qualified to work. It is not believed 
that any Detaining Power would, or that the Convention intended that 
it should, permit retained medical personnel to make final decisions in 
this regard.27 
2. Rank 
While Article 76 of Lieber's Code did contain the clause specifying 
that prisoners of war could be required to work "according to their 
rank," there was really no indication therein that the labor of all 
prisoners of war, regardless of rank, was not available to the Detain-
ing Power in some capacity. However, Article 25 of the Declaration of 
Brussels and Article 71 of the Oxford Manual both provided that pris-
oners of war could only be employed on work that would not be "humil-
iating to their military rank." Article 6 of the 1899 Hague RegUlations 
reverted to Lieber's rather vague phrase, "according to their rank"; 
but the 1907 Hague Regulations went a step further, adding to the 
foregoing phrase the words "officers excepted," thereby for the first 
time giving a legislative basis to a practice that had, in fact, already 
been generally followed.28 
Both the 1929 and the 1949 Conventions are much more specific in 
this regard, the latter amplifying and Clarifying the already much 
more detailed provisions of its predecessor. Thus, while the first para-
graph of Article 49 of the 1949 Convention authorizes the Detaining 
Power to utilize the labor of "prisoners of war," the second paragraph 
of Article 49 specifies that noncommissioned officers (NCOs) may only 
be required to do supervisory work, and the last paragraph of Article 
49 states without reservation that officers may not be compelled to 
work. It thus becomes clear that, as used in the first paragraph of 
27 Similarly, the function of determining whether a prisoner of war should be 
repatriated during hostilities for medical reasons is not assigned to the retained 
medical personnel, but is the responsibility of the medical personnel of the Mixed 
Medical Commissions consisting of two neutral members and one member appoint-
ed by the Detaining Power. See Article 112 and Annex II. For a discussion of the 
Mixed Medical Commissions, see pp. 411-412 infra. 
28 One Japanese scholar has asserted that during the Russo-Japanese war 
(1904-05), the Japanese exempted officer prisoners of war from the requirement 
to work. Ariga, Guerre ru8so-japonaise 114. However, another claims that Japan 
did not require any Russian prisoners of war to work. Takahashi, Russo-Japanese 
War 125. 
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Article 49, the term "prisoners of war" really refers only to enlisted 
men below the noncommissioned-officer grade-in other words, 
privates. 
During World War II several problems arose with respect to the 
identification of noncommissioned officers for labor purposes. In the 
first place, many NCOs had had their identification documents taken 
from them upon capture (probably for intelligence purposes) and 
were thereafter unable to establish their entitlement to recognition 
of their grade.29 On the other hand, a number of prisoners of war 
apparently claimed NCO grades to which they were not actually en-
titled, probably in order to avoid hard labor.30 The 1949 Convention 
attempts to obviate these problems. Thus, Article 21 of the 1929 Con-
vention provided only that, upon the outbreak of hostilities, the bellig-
erents would communicate to one another the titles and ranks in use 
in their armies in order to assure "equality of treatment between cor-
responding ranks of officers and persons of equivalent status." This 
was construed as limiting the requirements of this exchange of infor-
mation to the ranks and titles of commissioned officers. The first para-
graph of Article 43 of the 1949 Convention makes it clear that infor-
mation is to be exchanged concerning the ranks and titles of al~ 
persons who fall within the various categories of potential prisoners 
of war enumerated in Article 4 of the Convention.31 Further, during 
World War II the military personnel of each belligerent carried only 
such identification documents, if any, as that belligerent elected to 
provide to its personnel. In addition, as just noted, if the prisoner of 
29 The lCRC has stated that 26,000 German noncommissioned officers who were 
prisoners of war and whose identity papers had been taken from them in England 
were compelled to work while interned in the United States because of their in-
ability to prove their status. 1 lCRC Report 339. See note II-288 supra. The Germ-
an General Staff urged German noncommissioned-officer prisoners of war to work, 
very probably in order to avoid the deterioration, both physical and mental, which 
ineVitably overtakes the completely inactive prisoner of war. 1 lCRC Report 339. 
30 Early in 1945 the military authorities in the United States discovered that 
many German prisoners of war had false documents purporting to prove non-
commissioned officer status. They thereupon required all German prisone"rs of war 
who claimed to be noncommissioned officers to produce proof of such status in the 
form of a soldbuch or other official document. Thousands were unable to do so and 
were reclassified as privates. Rich, Brief History 516. To some extent these may 
have been the same prisoners of war referred to in the preceding note. 
31 See pp. 168-169 supra. It appears to the writer that the United States Army 
may have created problems for some of its members in this respect by the estab-
lishment of a "specialist" classification of enlisted men who, although grouped in 
the same statutory grades as noncommissioned officers, are apparently not such. 
Manes, Barbed Wire Command 14. The strict interpretation of the term "non-
commissioned officers" contemplated by the Soviet Union is evidenced by its de-
sire, expressed at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, to limit the exemption of non-
commissioned officers from the requirement to do work other than supervisory to 
regular army ("re-enlisted") personnel. 2A Final Record 348, 361 & 566. 
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war did have an identification document in his possession when cap-
tured. it was not unusual for the personnel of the Capturing Power 
to seize these documents for whatever intelligence value they might 
have, leaving the prisoner of war with no official identification materi-
al. The 1949 Convention attempts to remedy both of these defects. The 
third paragraph of Article 17 requires each belligerent to issue to the 
members of its armed forces an identification card containing, as a 
minimum, certain information concerning identity, including rank; 
prescribes the desirable type of card; provides that it be issued in 
duplicate; and states that while the prisoner of war must exhibit it 
upon the demand of his captors, under no circumstances may it be 
taken from him.32 This Article, if complied with by the belligerents, 
should do much to eliminate the problem of identifying noncommis-
sioned officers that existed during World War II and that undoubtedly 
resulted in denying to many prisoners of war the rights to which 
they were entitled.33 
Two other problems connected with the labor of noncommissioned 
officers are worthy of comment. On occasion, disputes may arise as to 
the types of work that can be construed as falling within the term 
"supervisory." The 1949 Diplomatic Conference made no attempt to 
solve this problem. There is much merit in the position taken by the 
lCRC that the term denotes "administrative tasks which usually con-
sist of directing other ranks; it obviously excludes all manuallabor."34 
The other problem concerns the right of a noncommissioned officer 
who has exercised the privilege given him. under both the 1929 and 
the 1949 Conventions to request work other than supervisory, there-
after to withdraw his request. During World War II different prac-
tices were followed by different belligerents. Thus Germany gave 
British noncommissioned officers the right to withdraw their re-
quests,3G while the policy of the United States was not to grant such 
requests for nonsupervisory work in the first place, unless they were 
32 See pp. 111-112 and 168-169 supra. 
33 Many men legitimately promoted in the combat zone may go for long periods 
of time without having an opportunity to obtain an identification card showing 
their new ranks and may become prisoners of war during that period. In view of 
the new concept of "advances of pay" contained in the first paragraph of Article 
60, it is all the more important for a sergeant to be able to establish that he is 
such. See pp. 198-200 supra. 
34 Pictet, Commentary 262. 
31i German Regulations No. 13, para. 59. The seeming magnanimity of this pro-
vision is somewhat nullified by the last two sentences thereof, which indicate that 
"the employment of British noncommissioned officers has resulted in so many 
difficulties that the latter have far outweighed the advantages. The danger of 
sabotage, too, has been considerably increased thereby." 
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for the duration of captivity in the United States.3S It has been urged 
that, inasmuch as a noncommissioned officer is free to volunteer to 
undertake nonsupervisory work, he should be equally free to discon-
tinue such work at will-subject to the right of the Detaining Power 
to provide him with such employment when he volunteers only if he 
agrees to work for a fixed term, which may be extended upon his 
request.37 This appears to be a logical and practical solution to the 
problem, although it is probably one to which not every belligerent 
will subscribe. 
The last paragraph of Article 49 is very clear that officers cannot be 
compelled to do any type of work, even supervisory, unless they vol-
unteer. Once they have done so, the problems relating to their labor are 
quite similar to those relating to the voluntary labor of noncommis-
sioned officers, except that as a matter of practice they were apparent-
ly rather generally permitted to discontinue working whenever they 
decided to do SO.38 In general, the labor of officers has not been the 
cause of any material dissension between belligerents.39 
3. Other Prisoners of War Exempted from Working 
Scattered throughout the 1949 Convention are a number of other 
provisions specifically limiting the work which may be required of 
certain categories of captured enemy personnel, prisoners of war or 
-other, held by the Detaining Power. Thus, medically trained personnel 
who, when captured, were not assigned to the medical services in the 
enemy armed forces and who are, therefore, ordinary prisoners of 
3S u.s. War Dept., Technical Manual TM 19-500, Enemy Prisoners of War, Ch. 
5, Sec. 1, para. 4c. This is no longer the policy of the United States. U.S. Army 
Regs. 633-50, para. 206a(2) provides that a noncommissioned officer " ... may at 
any time, revoke his voluntary request for work other than supervisory work." 
37 Pictet, Commentary 262. The CommentaT1.J continues with the statement that 
"during the Second World War, however, prisoners of war were sometimes more 
or less compelled to sign a contract for an indefinite period which bound them 
throughout their captivity; that would be absolutely contrary to the present pro-
vision." The present writer agrees that this should be the rule but confesses him-
self as unable to identify the provision of the second paragraph of Article 49 of 
the 1949 Convention which so provides, or to determine wherein, in this regard, it 
differs from its predecessor, the third paragraph of Article 27 of the 1929 Con-
vention. (Perhaps the Commentary is referring to Article 7.) 
38 1 ICRC Report, 338. Inasmuch as the third paragraph of Article 49 states 
that officers " ... may in no circumstances be compelled to work" (emphasis add-
ed), there is even less basis for denying them the right to discontinue work for 
which they have volunteered then there is for noncommissioned officers. U.S. 
Army Regs. 633-50, para. 206a (1) , covering commissioned officers, is substantially 
identical to the provision relating to NCOs quoted in note 36 supra. 
39 1 ICRC Report 337-38. During World War II Japan instituted a "no work 
no eat" policy for officers. I.M.T.F.E. 1176. An ex-prisoner of war has stated that 
coercion was used to force officers to volunteer to work. Schacht Statement. One 
writer says that under War Ministry orders officers were "guided" to "volunteer." 
Vizzard, Policy 263. 
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war, may be required to perform medical functions for the benefit of 
their fellow prisoners of war; but if so required, they are, under 
Article 32, entitled to the treatment accorded to retained medical per-
sonnel and are exempted from any other work.40 Under Article 36 this 
same rule applies to ministers of religion who were not serving as 
such when captured. Prisoners of war assigned to provide essential 
services in officer prisoner-of-war camps as orderlies may not, under 
the second paragraph of Article 44, be required to perform any other 
work. Finally, the first paragraph of Article 81 specifies that prisoners' 
representatives may likewise not be required to perform any other 
work, but this restriction applies only "if the accomplishment of their 
duties is thereby made more difficult."41 While these various provisions 
are not of very great magnitude in the overall prisoner-of-war picture, 
they can, of course, be of major importance to the particular indi-
viduals concerned. 
D. TYPES OF WORK THAT PRISONERS OF WAR MAY BE 
COMPELLED TO PERFORM 
The categories of industries in which prisoners of war may be com-
pelled to work and the types of labor which they may be compelled 
to perform in those industries have generated much controversy. Long 
before final agreement was reached thereon at the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference, the article of the Convention concerned with this problem 
had been termed "the most disputed article in the whole Convention, 
and the most difficult of interpretation."42 Unfortunately, it appears 
fairly certain that some of the agreements ultimately reached in this 
area are destined to magnify, rather than to minimize or eliminate, 
this problem.43 
The early attempts to draft rules concerning the categories of labor 
in which prisoners of war could be employed merely authorized their 
employment on "public works which have no direct connection with 
the operations in the theater of war,"44 or stated that the tasks of 
prisoners of war "shall have nothing to do with the military opera-
tions."45 The inadequacy of these provisions having been demonstrated 
. 40 See p. 73 supra. 
41 See pp. 303-304 infra. 
42 2A Final Record 442. Another participant in the 1949 Diplomatic Conference 
later wrote: "Perhaps no section of the Convention gave rise to more debate and 
expressions of differences of view than that dealing with 'Labour of Prisoners of 
War.' At the outset, it appeared that all that could be agreed upon was the fact 
that the 1929 treatment of the subject was inadequate and ambiguous." Dillon, 
Genesis 51. 
43 Baxter, Book Review, 50 A.J.I.L. 979. 
44 Article 25, Declaration of Brussels; Article 71, Oxford Manual. 
45 Article 6, 1899 Hague Regulations. The French (official) version of Article 6 
of the 1907 Hague Regulations is identical with its predecessor in this regard. 
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by the events of World War I, an attempt at elaboration was made in 
drafting the cognate provisions of Article 31 of the 1929 Convention, 
in which were included not only prohibitions against the employment 
of prisoners of war on labor having a "direct relation with war opera-
tions," but also against their employment on certain specified types 
of work-"manufacturing and transporting arms or munitions of any 
kind, or ... transporting material intended for combatant units." 
During World War II these latter provisions proved little more 
successful than their predecessors in regulating prisoner-of-war labor. 
The term "direct relations with war operations" once again demon-
strated itself to be exceedingly difficult to interpret16 in a total war 
in which practically every economic resource of the belligerents is 
mobilized for military purposes.47 Each belligerent attempting to com-
ply with the labor provisions of the 1929 Convention found itself re-
quired to make a specific determination in all but the very few obvious 
cases as to whether a particular occupation fell within the ambit of 
the prohibitions.48 As could be expected, there were many disputed 
decisions. 
In drafting the proposed new convention aimed at obviating the 
many difficulties which had arisen during the two world wars, the 
ICRC attempted a new approach to the prisoner-of-war labor prob-
46 "What constituted a direct relation with war operation was a matter of per-
sonal opinion or indeed, guess." Dillon, Genesis 52. An anonymous writer for the 
International Labour Organization found it questionable that the restrictions of 
the first paragraph of Article 31 of the 1929 Convention concerning work directly 
connected with war operations were being uniformly interpreted. Anon., Condi-
tions of Employment 186. After the end of World War II the United States Mil-
itary Tribunal in the I.G. Farben Case said (at 8 T.W.C. 1189) : 
To attempt a general statement in definition or clarification of the term 
"direct relation to war operations" would be to enter a field that the writers 
and students of international law have found highly controversial. 
47 Flory, Nouvelles conception 58; Janner, Puissance protect1'ice 54; Feilchen-
feld, Prisoners of War 13. 
48 Early in January 1943 the United States adopted the following policy with 
regard to prisoner-of-war labor: 
Any work outside the combat zones not having a direct relation with war 
operations and not involving the manufacture of transportation of arms or 
munitions or the transportation of any material clearly intended for combat 
units, and not unhealthful, dangerous, degrading, or beyond the particular 
prisoner's physical capacity, is allowable and desirable. 
AG letter of January 1943, subj: War Department Policy with respect to Labor 
of Prisoners of War, quoted in Lewis & Mewha 89. This was obviously so general 
as to cause many specific problems to arise, and in December 1943 the United 
States found it necessary to establish a Prisoner of War Employment Review 
Board (ibid., 113) which was called upon to make a great many decisions in this 
area. Mason, German Prisoners of War 211. Postwar researchers have collated 
lists which include literally hundreds of occupations as to which specific decisions 
were made. Lewis & Mewha 146-47, 166-67, & 203; Tollefson, Enemy Prisoners 
of War 62 note. 
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lem. Instead of specifying prohibited areas in broad and general terms, 
as had been the previous practice, leaving to the belligerents, the Pro-
tecting Powers, and the humanitarian organizations the decision as 
to whether a specific task was or was not prohibited, it decided to list 
affirmatively and with particularity the categories of labor in which 
the Detaining Power would be permitted to employ prisoners of war, 
at least impliedly prohibiting their use in any type of work not spe-
cifically listed.40 The International Red Cross Conference held in Stock-
holm in 1948, to which this new approach was proposed, accepted the 
idea of affirmatively specifying the areas in which prisoners of war 
could be required to work; but, instead of the enumeration of specifics 
which the ICRC had prepared, the Conference substituted general 
ferms.GO The ICRC was highly critical of this action.51 At the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference the United Kingdom proposed the substitution 
of the original ICRC proposal in place of that contained in the draft 
adopted at Stockholm, and it was this original text, with certain 
amendments which will be discussed later, which ultimately became 
Article 50 of the 1949 Convention. While there is considerable merit 
to the new approach, the actual phraseology of the Article leaves much 
to be desired. 52 An analysis of the various provisions contained in 
Article 50 of the 1949 Convention and, to the extent possible, a delimi-
tation of the areas covered, or probably intended to be covered, by 
each category of work which a prisoner of war may be "compelled" to 
do/53 and the problems inherent in each, is in order. 
411 Dmft Revised Conventions 82-83. 
50 The proposed new Article 42 (now 50) provided that "prisoners of war may 
be required to do only work which is normally required for the feeding, sheltering, 
clothing, transportation and health of human beings." Revised Draft Conven-
tions 69. It is of interest that that was substantially the basic policy that had 
been followed by the United States in interpreting the provisions of Article 31 of 
the 1929 Convention. McKnight, POW Employment 54. 
51 Remarks and Proposals 51-53. 
52 In its Report to the Plenary Assembly of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, 
Committee II (Prisoners of War) characterized this Article as one which "clari-
fies ... by a limitative enumeration of the categories of work which prisoners [of 
war] may be required to do." 2A Final Record 566. On the contrary, the expres-
sion "military character or purpose," used in subparagraphs (b), (c), and (f) of 
Article 50 are practically indefinable. As to these subparagraphs, the basic prob-
lem, as it existed when the words "war operations" were used, remains unchanged. 
Pictet, Commentary 266. In view of the obvious need for authoritative interpreta-
tions of the provisions of this article, it would be helpful if sizable groupings of 
nations, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, agreed upon and announced their 
interpretations of these provisions, as the Nordic Experts did in other areas. Un-
fortunately, NATO has apparently decided not to standardize procedures relating 
to the utilization of prisoner-of-war labor. STANAG No. 2044, para. 10. 
53 The difficulties experienced in selecting the appropriate verb to be used in the 
opening sentence of Article 50 were typical of the overall drafting problem. The 
following terms were contained in or suggested for the various texts, beginning 
with the original ICRC draft that was submitted to the 1948 Stockholm Confer-
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1. Camp Administration, Installation, or Maintenance 
This indirectly authorized category of prisoner-of-war labor refers 
to the management and operation of the camps established for the 
prisoners of war themselves; in other words, broadly speaking, it con-
stitutes their own "housekeeping." Early in World War II the United 
States divided all prisoner-of-war labor into two classes: class one, 
that related to their own camps; and class two, all other.li4 This dis-
tinction still appears to be a valid one. It has been estimated that the 
use of prisoners of war in the United States for the maintenance and 
operation of their own camps, and of other military installations,1S1S 
constituted their major utilization. 56 While this is believed to be some-
what of an overstatement, it can certainly be assumed that a very 
considerable portion of them will always be engaged in the adminis-
tration, installation, and maintenance of their own camps. However, 
it can also be assumed that in any future major international armed 
conflict demands for prisoner-of-war labor will be so great that short-
ages will exist, requiring that the administration of prisoner-of-war 
camps be conducted on an extremely austere basis. 
ence and continuing chronologically through the various drafts, amendments, and 
discussions, until final approval of the article by the Plenary Assembly: "obliged 
to" (Draft Revised Conventions 82-83) : "required to" (Revised Draft Conventions 
69); "obliged to" (3 Final Record 70); "employed on" (2A Final Record 272); 
"engaged in" (ibid., 470); "obliged to" (ibid., 344); "compelled to" (2B Final 
Record 176) ; and "compelled to" (Article 50 as adopted). 
54 POW Circular No.1, para. 77. Paragraph 78 of the same Circular contained 
the following informative enumeration: 
78. Labor in class one is primarily for the benefit of prisoners. It need not 
be confined to the prisoner of war camp or to the camp area. Class one labor 
includes: 
a. That which is necessary for the maintenance or repair of the prisoner of 
war camp compounds including barracks, roads, walks, sewers, sanitary facil-
ities, water pipes, and fences. 
b. Labor incident to improving or providing for the comfort or health of 
prisoners, including work connected with the kitchens, canteens, fuel, garbage 
disposal, hospitals, and camp dispensaries. 
c. Work within the respective prisoner companies as cooks, cook's helpers, 
tailors, cobblers, barbers, clerks, and other persons connected with the interior 
economy of their companies. In apportioning work, consideration will be given 
by the company commander to the education, occupation, or profession of the 
prisoner. 
55 The utilization of prisoner-of-war labor for the operation and maintenance of 
military installations occupied by the armed forces of the Detaining Power does 
not fall within the classification of camp administration referred to in the Conven-
tion. While many such uses would probably come within the category of domestic 
services (cooks, cook's helpers, waiters, kitchen police, etc.), which are authorized, 
it appears that many others are no longer permitted. Employment of prisoners of 
war in the Information Bureau maintained by the Detaining Power is specifically 
authorized by Article 122. 
56 Fairchild & Grossman 190. See also, McKnight, POW Employment 57. 
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2. Agriculture 
This field of prisoner-of-war utilization, with its collateral field of 
food processing, combined with camp administration to account for 
the labor of the great maj ority of employed prisoners of war during 
World War 11.07 There are no restrictions imposed by Article 50 (a) 
of the 1949 Convention on the employment of prisoners of war in any 
aspect of agricultural work,58 the fact that the product of their labor 
may eventuaIIy be used in the manufacture of a military item or be 
supplied to and consumed by combat troops being too remote to permit, 
or to warrant, restrictions. 59 
3. Production or Extraction of Raw Materials 
This category of compulsory employment, authorized by Article 
50 (b), includes activities in such industries as mining, logging, quar-
rying, etc. It is one of the areas in which problems constantly arose 
during World War II, and in which there were frequent disagreements 
between belligerents as weII as between Detaining Powers and Pro-
tecting Powers or humanitarian organizations. Thus, after the con-
clusion of World War II the 1CRC reported that it had been called 
upon to intervene more frequently with respect to prisoners of war 
who worked in mines than with respect to any other problem.60 
57 In the spring of 1940 more than 90 percent of the Polish prisoners of war 
held by the Germans were employed in agriculture; and while that percentage 
later dropped, it always remained extremely high. Anon., Employment in Germany 
317. In the United States, even though more than 50 percent of the man-months 
worked in industry by prisoners of war were performed in agriculture, the de-
mands for such labor could never be fully met. Lewis & Mewha 125-26. An excep-
tion occurred in Canada, where the great majority of the prisoners of war were 
used in the lumbering industry. Anon., Employment in Canada 337. 
1i8 Pictet, Commentary 266. It is incomprehensible that, despite the experiences 
of World War II, the enumeration that was originally proposed by the ICRC 
(Draft Revised Conventions 82-83), and was discarded by the 1948 Stockholm 
Conference (Revised Draft Conventions 69), only to be restored to the Convention 
by the 1949 Diplomatic Convention at the urging of the United Kingdom delega-
tion (3 Final Record, Annex 116, at 70), did not include agriculture as a permit-
ted class. A member of the United States delegation proposed that it be added at 
the beginning of the list, and his proposal was adopted without discussion or op-
position. 2A Final Record 470. 
59 An unsuccessful attempt to make this distinction in another context occurred 
in Vietnam, when the position was taken that herbicides could be used against 
crops intended for military consumption but not against crops intended for civ-
ilian consumption. Bindschedler 36-37. See also Levie, Weapons of Warfare 160. 
60 1 ICRC Report 329. For a specific example, see note 21 supra. (Unfortun-
ately, few data are available concerning the activities of Protecting Powers in this 
regard as they rarely publish any details of their wartime activities, even after 
the concluson of peace. An unofficial report of Swiss activities as a Protecting 
Power during World War II is contained in Janner, Puissance protectrice.) In 
the 1.G. Farben Case, 8 TWC at 1187, the Tribunal said: 
230 
Inasmuch as the utilization of prisoners of war in this field has been, 
and continues to be, authorized, the problems which arise usually relate 
either to the physical ability and aptitude of the particular prisoner 
of war to participate in heavy, difficult, and specialized labor of this 
nature, or to working conditions-including safety precautions and 
equipment-rather than to the fact of the utilization of prisoners of 
war in the specific industry. The first of these problems has already 
been discussed61 and the latter will be discussed in the general analysis 
of that particular problem.62 
4. Manufacturing Industries (except Metallurgical, Machinery, 
and Chemical)63 
In modern days of total warfare and the total mobilization of the 
economy of belligerent nations, it has become increasingly impossible 
to state with any degree of positiveness that any particular industry 
does not have some connection with the war effort. Where the degree 
of such connection is the criterion for determining the permissibility 
of the use of prisoners of war in a particular industry, as it was prior 
to the 1949 Convention, problems and disputes are inevitable. In this 
respect, by authorizing compulsory prisoner-of-war labor in most man-
ufacturing industries and by specifically prohibiting it in the three 
categories of industries that will be engaged almost exclusively in 
war work, Article 50 (b) of the new Convention represents a positive 
and progressive development in the law of war and has probably 
eliminated many potential disputes. 
During World War II the nature of the item manufactured and, to 
some extent, its intended ultimate destination determined whether or 
The use of prisoners of war in coal mines in the manner and under the con-
ditions disclosed by this record, we find to be a violation of the regulations of 
the Geneva Convention and, therefore, a war crime 
61 See pp. 218-221 supra. 
62 See pp. 240-244 supra. 
63 The source of some of the wording and punctuation of Article 50 (b) is some-
what obscure. As submitted by Committee II (Prisoners of War) to the Plenary 
Assembly of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, it read: 
... manufacturing industries, with the exception of iron and steel, machinery 
and chemical industries and of public works, and building operations which 
have a military character or purpose. 
2A Final Record 576 & 585-86. Although this portion of Article 50 was approved 
by the Plenary Assembly without amendment (2B Final Record 290-98), in the 
Final Act of the Conference (which is, of course, the official, signed version of the 
Convention) , the same provision reads: 
.•. manufacturing industries, with the exception of metallurgical, machinery 
and chemical industries; public works and building operations which have no 
mlitary character or purpose. 
1 Final Record 254. These changes in wording and puctuation (made in the Eng-
lish version only) represent both a considerable extension and a clarification and 
should eliminate many disputes which might otherwise have arisen. However, it 
would be interesting to ascertain just how they came about. 
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not the use of prisoners of war in its manufacture was permissible. 
Thus, in the United States it was determined that prisoners of war 
could be used in the manufacture of truck parts, as these had a civil-
ian, as well as a military, application; but that they could not be used 
in the manufacture of tank parts, as these had only a military appli-
cation. G4 Under the 1949 Convention neither the nature, nor the ulti-
mate destination, nor the intended use of the item being manufactured 
is material. All motor vehicles fall within the category of "machinery," 
and prisoners of war therefore may not be used in their manufacture. 
On the other hand, prisoners of war may be used in a food-processing 
plant or in a clothing factory, even though some, or even all, of the 
food processed or clothing manufactured may be destined for the 
armed forces of the Detaining Power. 
Two sound bases have been advanced for the decision of the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference to prohibit in its entirety the compelling of 
prisoners of war to work in the metallurgical, machinery, and chemi-
cal industries: first, that in any general war these three categories of 
industries wiII unquestionably be totally mobilized and will be used 
exclusively for the armaments industry; and second, that factories 
engaged in these industries wiII be key objectives of enemy air (and 
now of enemy rocket and missile) attacks and would therefore subject 
the prisoners of war to military action from which they are entitled 
to be isolated.GIi The 1949 Diplomatic Conference apparently balanced 
this total, industry-wide prohibition of compulsory labor in the three 
specified industries against the general authorization to use prisoners 
of war in every other type of manufacturing without requiring the 
application of any test to determine its relationship to the war effort 
of the Detaining Power. 
It should be borne in mind that the prohibition under discussion 
is directed only against compelling prisoners of war to work in the 
specified industries. (As we shall see, by inverted phraseology, sub-
paragraphs (b), (c), and (f) of Article 50 also prohibit the Detaining 
Power from compelling them to do certain other types of work where 
such work has "military character of purpose.") The question then 
arises as to whether they may volunteer for employment in the pro-
G-l Lewis & Mewha 77. After World War II one of the judges of a United States 
Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg held: 
... as a matter of law that it is illegal to use prisoners of war in armanent 
factories and factories engaged in the manufacture of airplanes for use in 
the war effort. 
The Milck Case, 2 TWC at 867. The decision in this regard would probably have 
been otherwise had the defense been able to show that the airplanes were intended 
exclusively for civilian use. Under Article 50 (b) it would be illegal to use prison-
ers of war on this type of work without regard to the intended use of the air-
planes, as they fall within the proscribed category of "machinery." 
Gli Pictet, Commentary 268-69. 
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hibited industries. Based upon the discussions at the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference,66 it clearly appears that the prohibitions contained in the 
various provisions of Article 50 are not, and were not intended to be, 
absolute in character and that a prisoner of war may volunteer to 
engage in the prohibited employments, just as he is affirmatively au-
thorized by Article 52 to volunteer for labor which is "of an unhealthy 
or dangerous nature." The problem will, of course, arise of assuring 
that the prisoner of war is a true volunteer and that neither mental 
coercion nor physical force has been used to "persuade" him to volun-
teer to work in the otherwise prohibited field of labor.67 However, the 
fact that this particular problem is difficult of solution (and that the 
possibility undoubtedly exists that some prisoners of war will be 
coerced into "volunteering") cannot be permitted to justify an incor-
rect interpretation of these provisions of the Convention, as to which 
the indisputable understanding of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference is 
clearly evidenced in the travaux preparatoi1'es. 
5. Public Works and Building Operations Which Have No 
Military Character or Purpose 
With respect to this provision of Article 50 (b) , it is first necessary 
to determine the meaning to be ascribed to the term "military charac-
ter or purpose." This is no easy task.68 Because the term defies defini-
66 As indicated in note 53 supra, the decision to use the words "compelled to" in 
the first sentence of Article 50 was reached only after the consideration and re-
jection of numerous alternatives. Words such as "prisoners may only be employed 
in" were strongly urged because they would preclude the Detaining Power from 
using pressure to induce prisoners of war to "volunteer" as they still could not 
be "employed" to do an unlisted class of work (2A Final Record 343) ; and words 
such as "prisoners of war may be obliged to do only" (or "compelled to do only") 
were just as strongly urged on the very ground that the alternative proposal 
would preclude volunteering (ibid., 342). The proponents of the latter position 
were successful in having their phraseology accepted. Ibid., 344; 2B Final Recol'd 
176. 
67 The ICRC appears to be inconsistent in asserting that the prohibition against 
work by prisoners of war. in these industries is absolute (Pictet, Commentary 
268), but that prisoners of war may volunteer to handle stores which are milit~,ry 
in character or purpose (ibid., 278), work which the Detaining Power is likewise 
prohibited from compelling prisoners of war to do. The statement that the abso-
lute prohibition of Article 7 against the voluntary renunciation of rights by pris-
oners of war was necessary "because it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove the 
existence of duress or pressure" (ibid., 89) is, of course, equally applicable to all 
of the prohibitions of Article 50 and 52, but the Diplomatic Conference obviously 
elected to take a calculated risk in this regard insofar as prisoner-of-wnr labor 
is concerned. 
68 In his post-Conference article, General Dillon showed considerable restraint 
when he said me:. .ly that many delegations believed that the phrase "will create 
some difficulty in future interpretations." Dillon, Genesis 52-53. He had been much 
more vehement at the Diplomatic Conference. 2A Final Record 342-43. As we shall 
see, the same problems are presented with respect to Article 50 (c) (see pp. 235-
236 and (f) (see p. 237). 
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tion in the ordinary sense of that word, it will be necessary to define 
by example. Moreover, the discussions which occurred at the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference unfortunately provide little that is helpful on 
this problem. 
A structure such as a fortification clearly has, solely and exclusively, 
a "military character." Conversely, a structure such as a bowling 
alley clearly has, solely and exclusively, a civilian character. The for-
tification is intended for use in military operations; hence it has not 
only a "military character" but also a "military purpose." The bowling 
alley is intended for exercise and entertainment; hence it does not 
have a "military purpose," even if some or all of the individuals using 
it will be members of the armed forces.69 
These examples have been comparatively black and white-at least 
insofar as it is possible to have black and white examples in this field. 
Unfortunately, as is not unusual, there is also a large gray area. This 
is particularly true of the term "military purpose." A structure will 
usually be clearly military or clearly civilian in character; but whether 
its "purpose" is military or civilian will not always be so easy of 
determination. A sewer is obviously civilian in character; and the fact 
that it is to connect a military training installation and the municipal 
sewage disposal plant does not give it a military purpose. On the other 
hand, a road is likewise civilian in character; but a road leading only 
from a military airfield to a bomb dump would certainly have a mili-
tary purpose. Similarly, a theater is civilian in character; but if it is 
a part of a military training installation and is to be used exclusively, 
or primarily, for the showing of military training films, then it, too, 
would have a military purpose. However, a theater which is intended 
solely for entertainment purposes, like the bowling alley, retains its 
civilian purpose, even though the audience will be largely military. 
To summarize, if the public works or building operations clearly 
have a military character, prisoners of war may not be compelled to 
work thereon; if they do not have a military character, but are being 
undertaken exclusively or primarily for a military use, then they will 
usually have a military purpose, and, again, prisoners of war may not 
be compelled to work thereon; while if they do not have a military 
character and are not being built exclusively or primarily for a mili-
tary use, then they have neither military character nor purpose, and 
69 The test is whether it is intended for military use and not whether it is in-
tended for use by the military. A bowling alley or a tennis court or a clubhouse 
might be intended, perhaps exclusively, for use by the military, but such struc-
tures certainly have no military use per se and, therefore, they do not have a 
"military purpose." 
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prisoners of war may be compelled to work thereon, even though 
there may be some incidental military use.70 
Having determined, insofar as it is possible to do so, the meaning 
of the term "military character or purpose," let us apply it to some of 
the problems which have heretofore arisen. Although the use of com-
pulsory prisoner-of-war labor in the construction of fortifications had 
long been considered improper,71 after World War II a United States 
Military Tribunal sitting in Nuremberg, found "uncertainty" in the 
law and held such labor not obviously illegal where it was ordered by 
superior authority and was not required to be performed in dangerous 
areas.72 Under the 1949 Convention such a decision would be clearly 
untenable. A fortification is military both in character and in purpose 
and the use of compulsory prisoner-af-war labor in its construction 
would be prohibited, no matter what the circumstances or location 
might be. The same is true of other construction of a uniquely military 
character such as ammunition dumps, firing ranges, tank obstacles. 
etc. On the other hand, brush clearance and the construction of fire-
breaks in wooded areas far from the combat zone, the digging of 
drainage ditches,73 the building of local air-raid shelters,74 and the 
clearing of bomb rubble from city streets75 are typical of the types of 
70 The foregoing is substantially the position taken by the United States in U.S. 
Army Regs. 633-50, para. 208b(1), which reads: 
(1) Military character or purpose . •.• The term "military character" ap-
plies to those items or to those types of construction which are used exclu-
sively by members of the Armed Forces for operational purposes (e.g., arms, 
helmets, gun emplacements, and confidence courses) as contrasted to items or 
structures which may be usd by either civilian or military personnel (e.g., 
food, soap, buildings, public roads, and railroads). The term "military pur-
pose" applies to activities which are intended primarily or exclusively for 
military operations as contrasted with activities intended primarily or exclu-
sively for other purposes .... 
It differs from the ICRC position which is that "[e]verything which is command-
ed and regulated by the military authority is of a military character, in contrast 
to what is commanded and regulated by the civil authorities." Pictet, Commentary 
267. However, the latter statement is somewhat leavened by a fairly broad inter-
pretation of the term "military purpose" on the basis that in wartime "anything 
may have an incidental military purpose" and that "an excessively restrictive in-
terpretation of the letter of the Convention ... would ultimately lead only to con-
tinuing and recurring infringements of the present provision." Ibid., 268. 
71 Flory, Prisoners of War 74. 
72 The High Command Case (U.s. v. Von Leeb), at 11 T.W.C. 534. No such un-
certainty existed in the minds of the members of the Tribunal with respect to the 
use of prisoners of war in the construction of combat-zone field fortifications. 
Ibid., 538. 
73 Lewis & Mewha 89-90. 
74 German Regulations No. 39, para 738. 
75 Pictet, Commentary 267-68, where a distinction is justifiably drawn between 
clearing debris from city streets and clearing it from an important defile used 
only for military purposes. 
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public works and building operations which have neither military 
character nor military purpose.76 
If the foregoing discussion has added but little light to the problem, 
it is hoped that it has at least focused attention on an area which can 
be expected to produce considerable controversy; and here, too, the 
problem will be further complicated by the question of volunteering. 
6. Transportation and Handling of Stores Which Are Not 
Military in Character or Purpose 
Article 31 of the 1929 Convention prohibited the use of prisoners of 
war in the transport of arms or munitions of any kind, or on the trans-
port of material destined for combatant units."77 The cognate provi-
sions of Article 50(c) of the 1949 Convention clarify this in some 
respects and obscure it in others. 
The former provision created problems in the determination of the 
point of time at which material became "destined" for a combatant 
unit and of the nature of a "combatant unit." These problems have 
now been eliminated, the ultimate destination of the material trans-
ported or handled no longer being decisive. However, creating new 
difficulties is the fact that the problem of the application of the amor-
phous term "military in character or purpose" is presented once again. 
Apparently, a prisoner of war may now be compelled to work in a 
factory manufacturing military uniforms, or gas masks, or camou-
flage netting, as these items are neither made by the three prohibited 
manufacturing industries, nor is their military character or purpose 
material; but once manufactured, a prisoner of war may not be com-
pelled to load them on a truck or freight car, as they probably have a 
military character and they certainly have a military purpose. Con-
versely, prisoners of war may not be compelled to work in a factory 
making barbed wire, inasmuch as such a factory is in the prohibited 
metallurgical industry; but they may be compelled to handle and trans-
port it where it is destined for use on farms or ranches, as it would 
711 See U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 208b (1) (a). 
77 For clear violations of this provision during World War II by the Germans, 
see Maughan, Tobruk 761-62; and by the Japanese, see I.M.T.F.E. 1082-83 and 
Vizzard, Policy 259, 263. See also, In re Student. (Student, a German airborne 
commander, was charged with responsibility for compelling newly captured British 
prisoners of war to unload arms and ammunition from German planes during the 
course of the attack on Crete by German parachutists. He was found guilty by a 
British Military Court, but the findings and sentence were not confirmed by the 
convening authority. It is impossible to say whether or not this was because of 
the acceptance of Student's contention that the temporary detailing of prisoners 
of war to work in the combat zone is unavoidable in airborne operations. The note 
of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (4 LRTWC 118) indicates the 
belief that the act was a clear breach of international law.) 
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then have neither military character nor purpose.78 Surely, the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference did not knowingly intend any such inconsistent 
results; but it is difficult to justify any other conclusions logically. 
Just as was determined with respect to public works and building 
operations, it is extremely doubtful that the ultimate intended use of 
the stores is, alone, sufficient to give them a military character or pur-
pose. Thus, as has been seen, agriculture and food processing are 
authorized categories of compulsory labor for prisoners of war with-
out any restrictions. The food grown and processed obviously has no 
military character; and the fact that it will ultimately be consumed 
by members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, even in a 
combat zone, does not give it a military purpose. Accordingly, prison-
ers of war may be compelled to handle and transport such stores. The 
same reasoning would apply to blankets and sleeping bags, to tents 
and tarpaulins, to socks and soap. 
In this general category, again, the prohibition is only against com-
pulsion, and prisoners of war who volunteer may be assigned to the 
work of transporting and handling stores, even though they have a 
military character or purpose. And, once again, the problem will arise 
of assuring that these prisoners of war have actually volunteered for 
the work to which they are assigned. 
7. Commercial Business, and Arts and Crafts 
It is extremely doubtful whether very many prisoners of war will 
be given the opportunity to engage in a commercial business, despite 
the fact that it is specifically listed in Article 50 (d), along with arts 
and crafts. The prisoner-of-war barbers, tailors, shoemakers, cabinet-
makers, etc.-all potential commercial entrepreneurs-will usually be 
required to ply their trades within the prisoner-of-war camp, for the 
benefit of their fellow prisoners of war as a part of the camp activities 
and administration. However, it is conceivable that in some locales 
they might be permitted to set up their own shops or to engage in 
their trades as employees of civilian shops owned by citizens of the 
Detaining Power. 
That prisoners of war will be permitted to engage in the arts and 
crafts is much more likely. No prisoner-of-war camp has ever lacked 
artists, both professional and amateur, who produce paintings, wood 
carvings, metal objects, etc., that find a ready market, usually through 
the camp canteen, among the military and civilian population of the 
Detaining Power.79 However, normally this category of work will be 
78 See U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 208b(1) (b) which states that "[i]f the 
stores in question are military in character, PW may not be compelled to engage 
in the transport or handling thereof. If the items are not military in character, 
then the purpose for which they are to be used is the determining factor." 
79 See e.g., notes II-70 and II-460 supra. 
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done during free time as a remunerative type of hobby, rather than 
as assigned labor.so 
8. Domestic Service 
The specific inclusion of this category of labor in Article 50 (e) 
merely permits the continuation of a practice that has been rather 
generally followed and that has rarely caused any difficulty, inasmuch 
as domestic services have never been construed as having a "direct 
relation with operations of war," even when such services are rendered 
to members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. Prisoners of 
war have very generally been required to work in laundries and bak-
eries of the armed forces of the Detaining Power and have been used 
in their messhalls as cooks, kitchen police, waiters, etc. As long as the 
domestic services are not required to be performed in an area where 
the prisoner of war will be exposed to the fire of the combat zone, 
which is specifically prohibited by the first paragraph of Article 23, 
the type of establishment in which he is compelled to perform the 
domestic services, and whether military or civilian, is not material. 81 
9. Public Utility Services Having No Military Character 
or Purpose 
Article 50 (f) is the third and final usage of the term "military char-
acter or purpose" in connection with prisoner-of-war labor. Its use 
here is particularly inept, inasmuch as it is difficult to imagine how 
public utility services such as gas, electricity, water, telephone, tele-
graph, etc., can under any crcumstances be deemed to have a military 
character.8:! With respect to military purpose, the conclusions previ-
ously reached are equally applicable here. If the utility services are 
intended exclusively, or primarily, for military use,83 they will have a 
military purpose and the Detaining Power is prohibited from com-
pelling prisoners of war to work on them. Normally, however, the 
same public utility services will be used to support both military and 
civilian activities and personnel and should not be considered as having 
a military purpose. 
80 The right of the Detaining Power to assign prisoners of war to these occupa-
tions (commercial business, arts and crafts) is, of course, unrestricted. 
81 Concerning the problem as to whether domestic service is "humiliating," see 
note 90 infra. 
8:! In Pictet, Commentary 268, the statement is made that these public utility 
services have a military character "in sectors where they are under military ad-
ministration." The present author finds it impossible to agree that the nature of 
the administration of these public utilities should determine their inherent char-
acter. If this were so, then public utility services administered by the military 
authorities in an occupied area, as is normally the case, would be military in 
character, even though it was originally constructed for, and is then being used 
almost exclusively by, the civilian population of the occupied territory. 
83 As, for example, where mobile generators are connected solely to military in-
stallations or equipment. 
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10. Limitations with Respect to Unhealthy, Dangerous, or 
Humiliating Work 
Article 52 of the 1949 Convention contains special provisions with 
respect to labor which is unhealthy, dangerous, or humiliating. These 
terms are not defined and it may be anticipated that their application 
will cause some difficulties and controversies. Nevertheless, the impor-
tance of these provisions cannot be gainsaid. 
Under the first paragraph of Article 52 a prisoner of war may not 
be employed on unhealthy or dangerous work, "unless he be a volun-
teer." Under the second paragraph of Article 52 a prisoner of war may 
not be assigned to labor which would be considered humiliating for a 
member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. No differences 
can be perceived to have resulted from the use of the verb "employed 
on" in the first instance and the verb "assigned to" in the second. Ac-
cordingly, it is believed that the omission of the clause "unless he be a 
volunteer" in the case of "humiliating" labor would preclude a Detain-
ing Power from permitting prisoners of war to volunteer for labor 
which is considered to be humiliating by the members of its own armed 
forces. (Perhaps the draftsmen believed that there would be no vol-
unteers for work of a humiliating nature and that such a clause would 
be mere surplusage.) 
Article 32 of the 1929 Convention forbade "unhealthy or dangerous 
work." After World War II this provision was stated to be declaratory 
of the customary international law of war.S4 In construing this provi-
sion, the United States applied three separate criteria: first, the in-
herent nature of the job (mining, quarrying, logging, etc.) ; second, 
the conditions under which it was to be performed (under a tropical 
sun, in a tropical rain, in a millpond in freezing weather, etc.) ; and, 
third, the individual capacity of the prisoner of war.S5 These criteria 
would be equally relevant in applying the substantially similar provi-
sions of Article 52 of the 1949 Convention.86 
There a~e numerous tables of experience factors available for deter-
mining whether a particular job is unhealthy or dangerous and is, 
84 U.S. v. von Leeb (the High Command Case, 11 TWC 537.) 
8;; Lewis & Mewha 112; McKnight, POW Employment 55. The.latter continues 
with the following statement: "The particular task is considered, not the industry 
as a whole. The specific conditions attending each job are decisive. For example, 
an otherwise dangerous task may be made safe by the use of a proper appliance, 
and an otherwise safe job rendered dangerous by the circumstances in which the 
work is required to be done. Work which is dangerous for the untrained may be 
safe for those whose training and experience have niade them adept in it." (The 
third criterion mentioned in the text, individual capacity, has already been dis-
cussed. See pp. 218-221 supra.) 
86 In determining whether an industry was of a nature to require special study 
before prisoners of war were assigned to work in it, the Judge Advocate General 
of the United States Army rendered the following opinion (SPJGW 1943/10908, 
11 August 1943.) : 
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therefore, one upon which prisoners of war may not be employed. 
Nevertheless, there will very probably be borderline cases in which 
disputes may well arise as to the utilization of nonvolunteer prisoners 
of war. However, there will unquestionably be more jobs to be filled 
in clearly permissible categories than there will be prisoners of war 
available to fill them. Accordingly, the Detaining Power that is at-
tempting to handle prisoners of war strictly in accordance with the 
provisions of the Convention can easily avoid disputes in this area by 
not using prisoners of war on labor of a controversial character. 
The last paragraph of Article 52 specifies that "[t]he removal of 
mines or similar devices shall be considered as dangerous labour." By 
this simple and unambiguous statement, the 1949 Diplomatic Confer-
ence, after one of its most heated and lengthy discussions.87 made it 
completely clear that the employment of prisoners of war on mine re-
moval is prohibited unless they are volunteers. The compulsory use of 
prisoners of war on this type of work was one of the most bothersome 
problems of prisoner-of-war utilization of World War II, particularly 
after the termination of hostilities.s8 This problem should not ari~e in 
any future major international armed conflict, except in the context 
of whether or not the prisoners of war so engaged are true volunteers. 
The application of the prohibition against the assignment of prison-
ers of war to work considered humiliating for members of the armed 
forces of the Detaining Power should cause few difficulties.89 Cer-
tainly, the existence or nonexistence of a custom or rule in this regard 
in the armed forces of the Detaining Power should rarely be a matter 
. . .If in particular industries the frequency of disabling injuries per million 
man-hours is: 
a. Below 28.0-prisoner-of-war labor is generally available therein; 
b. Between 28.0 and 35.0-the industry should be specifically studied, from 
the point of view of hazard, before assigning prisoner-of-war labor therein; 
c. Over 35.0-prisoner-of-war is unavailable, except for the particular work 
therein which is not dangerous. 
It must be borne in mind that, as indicated in the quoted statement, even in an 
industry in which prisoners of war may be employed, such as one involving the 
production or extraction of raw materials, a particular industry or a particular 
job may fall within the ban of being of an "unhealthy or dangerous nature." Fair-
child & Grossman 193-94. 
87 For the history and background of this problem and for the debate thereon 
at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, see: 1 ICRC Report 334; 3 Final Record 70-
71; 2A Final Record 272-73, 443-44, & 345; 2B Final Record 290-95 & 298-99; 
Pictet, Commentary 277-78. 
88 1 ICRC Report 333-34. 
80 In Pictet, Commentary 277, the following comment appears: "This rule has 
the advantage of being clear and easy to apply. The reference is to objective rules 
enforced by that [Detaining] Power and not the personal feelings of any indivi-
dual member of the armed forces. The essential thing is that the prisoner con-
cerned may not be the laughing-stock of those around him." 
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of controversy.90 It is probable that, in the main, problems in this area 
will arise because the standard adopted is that applied in the armed 
forces of the Detaining Power rather than that applied in the armed 
forces of the Power of Origin. While this decision was indubitably the 
only one which the 1949 Diplomatic Conference could logically have 
reached, it is not unlikely that prisoners of war will find this difficult 
to understand and that there will be tasks which they will consider 
to be humiliating, even though the members of the armed forces of the 
Detaining Power do not, particularly where the prisoners of war come 
from a nation having a very high standard of living and are held by a 
Detaining Power which has a considerably lower living standard. 
E. CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 
We have so far considered the two aspects of prisoner-of-war labor 
that are peculiar to that status: (1) who may be compelled to work; 
and (2) the fields of work in which they may be employed. Our discus-
sion now enters the areas in which most nations have laws governing 
the general conditions of employment of their own civilian citizens-
laws which, as we shall see, are often made applicable to the employ-
ment of prisoners of war. 
1. General Working Conditions 
The first paragraph of Article 51 of the Convention constitutes a 
fairly broad code of working conditions. It provides: 
Prisoners of war must be granted suitable working conditions, 
especially as regards accommodation, food, clothing and equip-
ment; such conditions shall not be inferior to those enjoyed by 
nationals of the Detaining Power employed in similar work; ac-
count shall also be taken of climatic conditions. 
These provisions, several of which derive directly from adverse ex-
periences of World War II, are for the most part so elementary as to 
require little exploratory discussion. However, one major change in 
basic philosophy is worthy of note. The 1929 Convention provided, in 
Articles 10 (accommodations) and 11 (food and clothing), that the 
90 Although prohibitions against the use of prisoners of war on humiliating 
work were contained in Article 25 of the Declaration of Brussels and in Article 
71 of the Oxford Manual, there was no similar provision in the 1899 or 1907 
Hague Regulations, nor in the 1929 Convention. Nevertheless, during World War 
II the United States recognized the prohibition against the employment of pris-
oners of war on degrading or menial work as a "well settled rule of the custom-
ary law of nations" (McKnight, POW Employment 54), and even prohibited their 
employment as orderlies for other than their own officers. Lewis & Mewha 113. 
While this latter type of work is prohibited for personnel of the United States 
Army, it is believed that the prohibition is based upon policy rather than upon 
the "humiliating" nature of an orderly's functions. Apparently this is settled 
policy for the United States as the same rule was included in U.S. Army Regs. 
633-50, para. 209c (2), issued in 1963. 
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minimum' standards for prisoners of war in these areas should be 
those of "troops at base camps of the Detaining Power."Ol These stan-
dards were equally applicable to working prisoners of war. The first 
paragraph of Article 25 of the 1949 Convention contains an analogous 
provision with respect to accommodations for prisoners of war gen-
erally!l2-but the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 51 quoted 
above make it abundantly clear that, as to lodging, food, clothing, and 
equipment of working prisoners of war, the minimum standard is no 
longer that of base troops of the Detaining Power, but is that of 
"nationals of the Detaining Power employed in similar work." More-
over, Article 26, which is concerned with prisoner-of-war food gen-
erally, contains, in its second paragraph, a specific provision under 
which working prisoners of war must be supplied "with such addi-
tional rations as are necessary for the labor on which they are em-
ployed" ;03 and Article 27, which is concerned with prisoner-of-war 
clothing generally, contains, in its second paragraph, a specific provi-
sion under which working prisoners of war "shall receive appropriate 
clothing, whenever the nature of the work demands." While all of 
these provisions of Articles 25, 26, 27, and 51 of the Convention actu- . 
ally represent a continuation of adherence to local national standards 
for working prisoners of war, it would appear that the national stan-
dards now applicable (civilian nationals in similar work) will be higher 
than those which were applicable under the 1929 Convention (troops 
at base camps) inasmuch as workers in many industries are frequently 
a favored class under wartime conditions.O-1 
With regard to a somewhat similar provision contained in the second 
paragraph of Article 51, less optimism appears to be warranted. This 
paragraph, making applicable to working prisoners of war "the na-
tional legislation concerning the protection of labor and, more par-
01 See pp. 124-131 supra 
02 See p. 124 supra. 
93 See p. 129 supra. During World War II, prisoners-of-war labor in the Soviet 
Union was fed "in accord with the output of work." Olson, Soviet Policy 48. If 
the basic food requirements of Article 26 and 51 are met, there appears to be no 
prohibition against the issuance of additional items of food as an incentive bonus. 
The difficulty is that under this system the basic premise rarely exists. Thus, the 
same author states that in the Soviet Union work quotas were established and 
"food ... received was in proportion to quotas filled." Ibid., 46. 
9-1 It has been asserted that not only must the living conditions of working 
prisoners of war not be inferior to those of local civilian workers, but also that 
this provision may not "prevent the application of the other provisions of the Con-
vention if, for instance, the standard of living of citizens of the Detaining Power 
is lower than the minimum standard required for the maintenance of prisoners 
of war!' Pictet, Commentary 271. While the draftsmen of the Convention may well 
have intended to establish two separate standards in this area, it is difficult to 
believe that any belligerent will provide prisoners of war with a higher standard 
of living than that to which its own civilian citizens have been reduced as a result 
of a rigid war economy. 
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ticularly, the regulations for the safety of workers," was the result 
of a proposal made by a delegate of the Soviet Union at the 1949 Dip-
lomatic Conference, which received the immediate support of the 
United States and others.95 This support was undoubtedly premised 
on the assumption that, if adopted, the proposal would increase the 
protections afforded to working prisoners of war.96 Second thoughts 
.indicate that this provision may constitute a basis for reducing the 
protection which it was intended to afford prisoners of war engaged 
in dangerous employments. The ICRC has deemed it necessary to point 
out that national standards may not here be applied in such a manner 
as to reduce the minimum standards established by the Convention.97 
It now appears unfortunate that the Diplomatic Conference adopted 
the Soviet proposal rather than the suggestion of the representative of 
the International Labor Organization that it be guided by the inter-~ 
nationally accepted standards of safety for workers contained in inter-
national labor conventions then already in being.98 Moreover, the safety 
laws and regulations are not the only safety measures which are tied 
to national standards. The third paragraph of Article 51 requires 
that prisoners of war receive training and protective equipment ap-
propriate to the work in which they are to be employed "similar to 
those accorded to the nationals of the Detaining Power."99 This same 
paragraph likewise provides that prisoners of war "may be submitted 
to the normal risks run by these civilian workers." Inasmuch as the 
test as to what are "normal risks" is based upon the national stan-
dards of the Detaining Power, this provision, too, would appear to be 
a potential breeding ground for disagreement and dispute-particu-
larly as the "normal risks" which civilian nationals of the Detaining 
Power may be called upon to undergo under the pressures of a wartime 
95 2A Final Record 273-75 & 446-47. 
96 It should be noted that the International Labour Organization proposed an 
additional article which would have allowed Detaining Powers to employ women 
prisoners of war only in accordance with the principles applicable for employed 
women nationals. Diplomatic Conference Documents, Memorandum by the Inter-
national Labour Organization, Document No.7, para. 9. This proposal was op-
posed by the United Kingdom (ibid., Observation 11) and the United States (ibid., 
Observations 13-14) on the ground that the national standard might be unsatis-
factory, or even nonexistent. The proposal was not discussed at the 1949 Diplo-
matic Conference. 
97 Pictet, Commentary 271-72. 
98 2A Final Record 275. 
99 It could be argued that a proper construction of the grammer of this provi-
sion makes only the protective equipment, and not the training, subject to national 
standards. However, this is debatable, and, even if true, it would merely result in 
the application of an international standard in the very area where the national 
standard would probably be acceptable. 
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economy will probably bear little relationship to the risks permitted 
under normal conditions.10o 
The reference to the climatic conditions under which labor is per-
formed, contained in the first paragraph of Article 51 quoted above, 
is one of the provisions deriving from the experiences of World War 
!I. lOl The second paragraph of Article 9 of the 1929 Convention pro-
vided generally that prisoners of war captured "where the climate is 
injurious for persons coming from temperate climates, shall be trans-
ported, as soon as possible, to a more favorable climate."102 It is well 
known that in a large number of cases this was not done. The second 
paragraph of Article 22 of the 1949 Convention contains a somewhat 
similar general provision concerning physical transfers; but it was 
recognize<;i that, despite the best of intentions, belligerents will not 
always be in a position to arrange for the physical transfer of pris-
oners of war from the land areas in which they are captured to one 
with a climate comparable to that of their homeland. Accordingly, the 
1949 Diplomatic Conference wrote into the Convention the quoted ad-
ditional admonition with respect to climatic conditions and prisoner-
of-war labor. It follows that, where a Detaining Power cannot (at 
least for the time being) transport prisoners of war out of an area 
of an unhealthy climate-whether tropical or arctic-it must, if it 
desires to utilize the labor of the prisoners of war in that area even 
temporarily, make due allowances for the climate, giving them prop-
er clothing,103 the necessary protection from the elements, appropriate 
working periods, etc. 
Article 51 of the 1949 Convention concludes these provisions with 
a prohibition against the rendering of working conditions more ardu-
ous as a disciplinary measure.104 In other words, the standards for 
working conditions, be they international or national,. established by 
100 It must be noted, however, that the "normal risks" provision of the third 
paragraph of Article 51 is specifically made subject to the restrictive provisions 
of Article 52, concerning which see pp. 238-240 supra. 
101 The I.M.T.F.E. (at 1002) mentioned "forced labor in tropical heat without 
protection from the sun" as one of the atrocities committed against prisoners of 
war by the Japanese. Concerning the violations of international law involved in 
the construction of the Burma-Siam railroad, see I.M.T.F.E. 1049-57; Bergamini, 
Japan's Imperial Conspiracy 968-69 & 971. The motion picture "The Bridge on 
the River Kwai" graphically portrayed the problem. 
102 See pp. 121-123 supra. 
103 Article 27 specifically provides that in issuing clothing to prisoners of war, 
without regard to the work at which they are employed, the Detaining Power 
" ... shall make allowance for the climate of the region where the prisoners are 
detained." The requirements in this regard of the first paragraph of Article 51 
are probably more extensive. Pictet, Commentary 271. 
104 Article 89 contains an enumeration of the punishments which may be admin-
istered to a prisoner of war as a disciplinary measure for minor violations of 
applicable rules and regulations. 
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the Convention, may not be disregarded in the administration of dis-
ciplinary punishment to a prisoner of war, and it is completely im-
material whether the act for which he is being punished occurred in 
connection with, or entirely apart from, his work. Thus, a Detaining 
Power may not lower safety standards, disregard requirements for 
protective equipment, lengthen working hours, withhold required ex-
tra rations, etc., as punishment for misbehavior. On the other hand, 
"fatigue details" of not more than two hours a day, or a monetary 
fine, or the withdrawal of extra privileges, all of which are authorized 
as disciplinary punishment by Article 89, undoubtedly could be im-
'posed, as they obviously do not fall within the ambit of the prohibi-
tion; and the extra rations to which prisoners of war are entitled 
under Article 26, when they are engaged in heavy manual labor, could 
undoubtedly be withheld from a prisoner of war who refuses to work, 
inasmuch as he would no longer meet the requirement for entitlement 
to such extra rations. 
~ 
2. Labor Detachments 
In the usual arrangement contemplated by the Convention for the 
utilization of the labor of prisoners of war, each working day the 
prisoners of war go from their camp to their place of employment, 
returning to the camp upon the completion of their working period. 
However, another arrangement is authorized by the Convention-the 
so-called labor detachment. Thus, where the place at which the work 
is to be accomplished is too far from any prisoner-of-war camp to 
permit the daily round trip, a labor detachment may be established. 
These labor detachments, which were widely used during World War 
II,lo5 are merely miniature prisoner-of-war camps, established in order 
to meet more conveniently a specific labor requirement. Article 56 of 
the 1949 Convention requirel? that they be organized and administered 
in the same manner as, and as a part of, a prisoner-of-war camp. 
Prisoners of war making up a labor detachment are entitled to all 
the rights, privileges, and protections which are available under the 
Convention to prisoners of war assigned to, and living in, a regular 
prisoner-of-war camp.106 However, the fact that local conditions ren-
10;; At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference the representative of the ICRC (Wel-
helm) stated that experience had indicated that the majority of all prisoners of 
war were maintained in labor detachments. 2A Final Record 276. This is confirmed 
by the series of articles which appeared in the International Labour Review dur-
ing the course of World War II. See Anon., Conditions of Employment 187; Anon .• 
Employment in Germany 318; Anon., Employment in Great Britain 191; Mc-
Knight, POW Employment 49; and Anon., Employment in Canada 336. 
106 In addition to the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 56 for 
the observance of the provisions of the Convention in labor detachments, specific 
provisions as to these detachments are contained in Article 33 (a) (medical !'erv-
ices), 35 (spiritual services), and 79 and 81 (prisoners' representatives), among 
others. 
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der it impossible to make a labor detachment an exact replica of the 
prisoner-of-war camp of which it is a satellite does not necessarily 
indicate a violation of the Convention. As long as the provisions of 
the Convention are observed with respect to the particular labor de-
tachment, it must be considered to be properly constituted and op-
erated.107 
One other point with respect to labor detachments is worthy of note. 
While Article 39 requires that prisoner-of-war camps be under the 
"immediate authority of a responsible commissioned officer belonging 
to the regular armed forces of the Detaining Power,"108 there is no 
such requirement as to labor detachments. Although Article 56 pro-
vides that each labor detachment is under the authority of the com-
mander of the prisoner-of-war camp to which it is administratively 
attached, and this camp commander will, of course, be a commissioned 
officer, there does not appear to be any prohibition against the assign-
ment of a noncommissioned officer as the commander of the labor 
detachment in place. In view of the large number of labor detach-
ments which will probably be established by each belligerent, it is 
safe to assume that the great majority of them will be under the 
immediate command of noncommissioned officers. 
A situation under which the utilization of prisoner-of-war labor 
will usually, although not necessarily, require the establishment of 
labor detachments is where their services are being used by private 
individuals or business organizations. This is the method by which 
most of the many prisoners of war engaged in agriculture (and em-
ployed in large private industrial concerns) will probably be admin-
istered. During World War II, prisoners of war performing labor 
under these circumstances were frequently denied the basic living 
standards guaranteed to them by the provisions of the 1929 Conven-
tion.1011 The first paragraph of Article 57 of the 1949 Convention 
specifically provides not only that the treatment of prisoners of war 
working for private persons "shall not be inferior to that which is 
provided for by the present Convention," but also that the Detaining 
Power, its military authorities, and the commander of the prisoner-
of-war camp to which the labor detachment is attached, all continue 
107 For example, Article 25 requires that billets provided for prisoners of war 
must be adequately heated. The fact that the parent prisoner-of-war camp has 
central heating, while the billets occupied by the prisoners of war assigned to a 
satellite labor detachment have separate, but adequate heating facilities, does not 
constitute a violation of the Convention. 
108 See pp. 163-164 supra. 
109 The third paragraph of Article 56 requires the prisoner-of-war camp com-
mander to maintain records of the labor detachments dependent on his camp and 
to make these available to the Protecting Power and to the lCRC. This is to ensure 
that there are no "lost" labor detachments, the members of which are completely 
denied the benefits of the Convention, as occurred during World War II. 
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to be responsible for their maintenance, care, and treatment ;110 and 
the second paragraph of Article 57 specifically provides that these 
prisoners of war have the right to communicate with the prisoners' 
representative in the prisoner-of-war camp.l11 It remains to be seen 
whether the changes made in the provisions relating to the mainte-
nance of labor detachments will accomplish their purpose of pro cur· 
ing for prisoners of war in labor detachments the same treatment to 
which they are entitled in the prisoner-of-war camp itself.112 
One problem which may arise in the use of prisoner-of-war labor 
in labor detachments by private persons is that of guarding the pris. 
oners of war. Frequently, the Detaining Power will provide military 
personnel for this purpose. When it does so, the problems presented 
are no different from those which arise at the prisoner-of-war camp 
itself. If paroles have been given to and accepted by the prisoners 
of war concerned, there are likewise no problems peculiar to the 
situation.ll3 But suppose that civilian guards are used. What authority 
do they have to compel a prisoner of war to work if he refuses to 
do so? Or to prevent a prisoner of war from escaping? And to what 
extent may they use force on a prisoner of war? 
If a prisoner of war assigned to work for a private employer re· 
fuses to do so, the proper action to take would unquestionably be to 
notify the military commander of the prisoner-of-war camp to which 
the labor detachment is attached. The latter is in a position to have 
110 The unique references to "military authorities" contained in Article 56 and 
57 were undoubtedly included in order to make it beyond dispute that, like the 
camp commander, the appropriate military authorities of the Detaining Power 
were not relieved from responsibility when the prisoner-of-war labor detachments 
are maintained by and at the sites selected by the civilian "employer" for whom 
the members of the detachments are working. 
111 Concerning the prisoners' representative in labor detachments, see pp. 298 
and 300-301 infra. The latter provision cited in the text was included in order 
to enable the members of the labor detachments to register complaints concerning 
their treatment should they believe that it is in any respect below Convention 
standards. Of course, complaints may also be made to the representatives of the 
Protecting Power, who may visit these labor detachments whenever they so desire 
(Articles 56 and 126), but these latter are not always readily available, while the 
prisoners' representatives are. During World War II both the United Kingdom 
and the United States provided for inspections by their own military authorities 
of the treatment of prisoners of war who were members of labor detachments 
working for private persons. Anon., Employment in Great Britain 192; Mason, 
German Prisoners of War 213. 
112 It should be mentioned that even though prisoners of war may be members of 
a labor detachment working for a private individual, that is merely a contractual 
relationship between the Detaining Power and the private individual as a pur-
chaser of labor services. It does not affect the status of the prisoners of war and 
there is no contractual relationship between the private individual and the pris-
oners of war. But see note II-363 supra. 
113 Concerning parole. see pp. 398-402 infra. 
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an independent investigation made and to impose disciplinary pun-
ishment or to have charges preferred, as he deems appropriate. 
If a prisoner of war assigned to work for a private employer who 
is not provided with military guards attempts to escape, the authority 
of the civilian guards is extremely limited. That they may use rea-
sonable force, short of firearms, seems fairly clear. That they may 
use firearms to prevent escapes is highly questionable.1l4 Detaining 
Powers would be well advised not to assign any prisoner of war to this 
type of labor, where he is to be completely unguarded or guarded only 
by civilians, unless the prisoner of war has accepted parole, or unless 
the Detaining Power has evaluated the likelihood of attempted escape 
by the particular prisoners of war and has determined to take a cal-
culated risk in their cases. 
3. Working Hours, Holidays, and Vacations 
Article 53 of the 1949 Convention covers all aspects of the time 
periods of prisoner-of-war labor. As to the duration of daily work, 
the first paragraph of Article 53 provides that (1) this must not be 
excessive; (2) it must not exceed the work hours for civilians in the 
same district; and (3) travel time to and from the job must be in-
cluded in the computation of the workday; and the second paragraph 
of Article 53 provides that (4) a rest of at least one hour (longer, 
if civilian nationals receive more) must be allowed in the middle of 
the day. 
The prohibition against daily labor which is "excessive" in duration 
is the same prohibition which had been included in Article 30 of the 
1929 Convention. Here again, we have the application of a national 
standard, and in an area in which such a standard ~ad proved to be 
disadvantageous to prisoners of war during World War II.llf; The 
Greek Government had proposed the establishment of an international 
standard-a maximum of 8 hours a day for all work except agricul-
ture, where a maximum of 10 hours would have been authorized.1l6 
114 In Pictet, Commentary 296, the argument is made, and with considerable 
merit, that escape is an act of war and that only military personnel of the De-
taining Power are authorized to respond to this act of war with another act of 
war-the use of weapons against a prisoner of war. This theory finds support in 
the safequards surrounding the use of weapons against prisoners of war, espec-
ially those involved in escapes, found in Article 42 of the Convention. See pp. 403-
404 infra. 
llG 2A Final Record 275. 
116 Diplomatic Conference Documents, Memorandum by the Greek Government, 
Document No. 11, at 9. 
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This proposal was overwhelmingly rejected.1l7 As has already been 
pointed out with regard to other problems, where a national rather than 
an international standard has been adopted, very few nations at war 
could afford to grant to prisoners of war more favorable working 
conditions than those accorded to their own civilian citizens.lls With 
respect to hours of daily work, it must be noted, too, that the limita-
tions contained in the Article cannot be circumvented by the adoption 
of piecework, or some other task system, in lieu of a stated number 
of working hours, the third paragraph of Article 53 of the Convention 
specifically prohibiting the rendering of the length of the working day 
excessive by the use of this method.119 
The provision for a midday rest of a minimum of one hour, con-
tained in the second paragraph of Article 53, is new120 and is subject 
to the national standard only if the latter is more favorable to the pri-
soner of war than the international standard established by the Con-
vention. In other words, it may be necessary for the Detaining Power 
to increase the midday rest period given to prisoners of war if its own 
civilian workers receive a rest period in excess of one hour, but it may 
not, under any circumstances, be shortened to less than one hour. 
The second paragraph of Article 53 further provides that prisoners 
117 2B Final Record 300. It is, of course, impossible to identify the specific point 
at which further work becomes "excessive." It has been suggested that the normal 
ILO limits of 8 hours a day and 48 hours a week should be applied. Pictet, Com-
mentary 280. However, this is exactly what the 1949 Diplomatic Conference re-
fused to approve. During World War II the maximum daily hours of work for 
prisoners of war in the United States was 10, including travel time. Lewis & 
Mewha79. 
liS The 1947 Conference of Government Experts had originally considered set-
ting maximum working hours, but had finally decided against so doing because 
it would be "discrimination in favor of PW, which would not be acceptable to the 
civilian population of the DP." 1947 GE Report 176. As stated in Anon., Condi-
tions of Employment 194: "The prisoner [of war] cannot expect better treatment 
than the civilian workers of the detaining Power .... His fate depends upon the 
extent to which the standards of the country where he is imprisoned have been 
lowered through the exigencies of the war." 
119 During World War II many Detaining Powers used the piece or taskwork 
method of controlling prisoner-of-war labor. Pictet, Commentary 282; Anon., Em-
ployment in Canada 337. (In the United States the piecework system was used, 
but to control pay rather than work hours. Lewis & Mewha 120-21. As long as 
the pay does not drop below the minimum prescribed in Article 62, there would 
appear to be no objection to this procedure.) Even when a Detaining Power was 
faithfully attempting to comply with the worktime provisions of Article 30 of the 
1929 Convention, prisoners of war were sometimes, out of necessity, kept overtime 
and usually received extra work pay for this. Anon., Conditions of Employment 
183. This may present a problem for the future, inasmuch as ultimate settlement 
of prisoner-of-war accounts are now to be made by the Power of Origin, not by 
the Detaining Power which benefited from the overtime. See p. 205 supra. 
120 This is the only provision ,vith respect to daily hours of work which was 
not contained in almost identical words in Article 30 of the 1929 Convention. 
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of war shall be entitled to a 24-hour rest every week, preferably on 
Sunday, "or the day of rest in their country of origin." Except for the 
quoted phrase, which was added at the request of Israel but which 
should be of equal importance to the pious Moslem, a similar provision 
was contained in Article 30 of the 1929 Convention. This provision is 
not subject to national standards, whether the national standard is 
more liberal or more restrictive. I !!1 And finally, Article 53 grants to 
every prisoner of war who has worked for one year "a rest of eight 
consecutive days" with pay. This provision is new and is of a nature to 
create minor problems, as, for example, whether normal days of rest 
are excluded from the computation of the eight days, what activity is 
permitted to the prisoner of war during his "vacation," and what he 
may be required to do during this period. However, despite these ad-
ministrative problems, the provision should prove a great boon to every 
individual who undergoes a lengthy period of detention as a prisoner 
of war. 
4. Compensation and Other Monetary Benefits 
We have already had occasion to review the problem of "working 
pay"-the compensation to which a prisoner of war is entitled under 
the provisions of the 1949 Convention for the work performed by him 
in his capacity as a prisoner of warP!! However, there is one other 
aspect of the compensation problem which it is appropriate to con-
sider at this point-compensation for disabilities sustained by prison-
ers of war as a result of work-connected accidents or disease. What 
is the lot of the prisoner of war who is the victim of an industrial 
accident or contracts an industrial disease and is thereby incapaci-
tated, either temporarily or permanently? Does he receive any type 
of compensation, and if so, what, when, from whom" and how? 
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations were silent on this problem. 
The multilateral prisoner-of-war agreement negotiated at Copenhagen 
in 1917, the Final Act of the Conference of Copenhagen, adopted a 
Russian proposal which placed upon the Detaining Power the same 
121 Nor was it subject to national standards in Article 30 of the 1929 Conven-
tion, but the Germans refused to accord prisoners of war a weekly day of rest 
on the ground that the civilian population did not receive it. Janner, Puissance 
protectrice 54. German employers devised the system of "shadow gangs," termed 
the "clearest cases of violations" of the Sunday rest provision that occurred dur-
ing World War II. 1 ICRC Report 329. A small number of German workers would 
work on Sunday with a large number of prisoners of war-but, while the prison-
ers of war were compelled to work every Sunday, the German workers rotated and 
were called to such work only at long intervials. The German military authorities 
forbade this practice in 1941 (German Regulations No.5, para. 9), but a directive 
issued in 1944 (German Regulations No. 44, para. 822) indicates that a major 
relaxation of the earlier order had occurred. See also Anon., Employment in Ger-
many 323. The Russians, not bound by the 1929 Convention, gave Sunday off in 
theory but not in practice. Anon., POW in Russia 8. 
122 See pp. 201-205 supra. 
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responsibility in this regard that it had toward its own citizens; but 
the 1917 Agreement between Great Britain and Germany provided 
merely that the Detaining Power should provide the injured prisoner 
of war with a certificate as to his occupational injury.123 The pro-
cedure adopted at Copenhagen was subsequently incorporated into 
Article 27 of the 1929 Convention, and in 1940, after some abortive 
negotiations with the British, Germany enacted a law implementing 
this procedure.124 The United States subsequently established this 
same policy,125 but the United Kingdom considered that it was required 
only to furnish the injured prisoner of war all required medical and 
other care.126 
Inasmuch as no payments were ever made to injured prisoners of 
war by the former Detaining Powers after their repatriation,127 it is 
not surprising that in redrafting the pertinent provisions in formu-
lating the policies for the 1949 Convention, the procedure specified in 
the 1929 Convention was replaced with one more nearly resembling 
that which had been adopted in the 1917 bilateral agreement between 
Great Britain and Germany.128 The procedure so established is con-
tained in the overlapping provisions of Articles 54 and 68.129 When a 
prisoner of war sustains an injury as a result of a work-connected 
accident, or incurs an industrial disease, the Detaining Power has the 
obligation of providing him with all required care-medical, hospital, 
and general maintenance-during the period of his disability and 
123 Flory, Prisoners of War 79-80. The French (and the Swiss) had still a 
different approach: upon repatriation, prisoners of war who had suffered indus-
trial accidents were to be treated as wounded combatants. Rosenberg, Internation-
al Law concerning Accidents to War Prisoners Employed by Private Enterprises, 
36 A.J.l.L. at 295 & 296. 
124 Lauterpacht, Problem 373. Lauterpacht labels the negotiations as "elabor-
ate" and as "concerning the relatively trivial question of the interpretation of 
of Article 27." 
125 POW Circular No.1, paras. 91 & 92; McKnight, POW Employment 63. For 
a postwar decision increasing the rate of disability compensation, see JAGA 19501 
2239,13 July 1950. 
126 Lauterpacht, Problem 373 n.2. 
127 Lewis & Mewha 156. 
128 In the British Manual para. 185, note 1, the statement is made that during 
the World War II negotiations the United Kingdom "considered that its domestic 
workmen's compensation legislation was too complex and so bound up with the 
conditions of free civilian workmen as to make it impracticable to apply it to pris-
oners of war." That position has become no less valid with the passing of the 
years since the end of that war. 
129 This redundancy was discussed at some length at the 1949 Diplomatic Con-
ference, with the Soviet Union taking the position that there was unnecessary 
duplication and the United Kingdom taking the position that Article 68 added 
something to Article 54. 2A Final Record 550-51. While Article 68 does contain 
data regarding the contents of the certificate to be furnished by the Detaining 
Power, there does not appear to be any reason why this could not have been 
merged into Article 54. 
251 
his continuation in the status of a prisoner of war.130 The only other 
obligation of the Detaining Power is to provide the prisoner of war 
with a statement, properly certified, "showing the nature of the injury 
or disability, the circumstances in which it arose and particulars of 
medical or hospital treatment." Also, a copy of this statement must 
be sent to the Central Prisoners of War Agency, thus ensuring its 
permanent availability. 
If a prisoner of war desires to make a claim for compensation while 
still in the prisoner-of-war status, he may do so, but his claim will 
be addressed to his Power of Origin, not to the Detaining Power. 
transmittal being through the medium of the Protecting Power.l31 
The Convention makes no provision for the procedure to be followed 
beyond this point, probably for the reason that the problem is then 
a domestic one, involving solely the relations between the Power of 
Origin and a member of its own armed forces, which would obviously 
be inappropriate for inclusion in an international convention. It may 
well be that, in the long run, the present policy, by transferring ulti-
mate liability to the Power of Origin, will prove of more value to 
the disabled prisoner of war than the apparently more generous policy 
contained in the 1929 Convention.132 
It must be pointed out, however, that in one respect the procedure 
thus adopted by the 1949 Convention contains an obvious injustice: 
there is no provision entitling the prisoner of war who suffers a work-
connected disability to continue to receive credits for working pay. 
While it is acceptable, and perhaps even preferable, to place ultimate 
responsibility on the Power of Origin for compensating the prisoner 
of war for his industrially caused disability, no reason can be per-
ceived for relieving the Detaining Power not only of this liability, but 
even of that of the continued payment to the disabled prisoner of war 
130 Articles 40 and 95 of the Fourth (Civilians) Convention place upon the De-
taining Power the responsibility of providing "compensation for occupational ac-
cidents and diseases." The variation between these provisions and those of Arti-
cle 54 of the Prisoner-of-War Convention was noted by the Coordination Commit-
tee of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference (2B Final Record 149), but Committee II 
(Prisoners of War) determined that such a provision was not necessary for pris-
oners of war. 2A Final Record 402. 
131 It has been suggested that "since under Article 51, paragraph 2, he [the 
prisoner of war] is covered by the national legislation [of the Detaining Power] 
concerning the protection of labour," a prisoner of war disabled in an -industrial 
accident or by an industrial disease would, while still a prisoner of war, be en-
titled to benefit from local workmen's compensation laws. Pictet, Commentary 
287. Is is believed that the application of this general provision of the Convention 
has been restricted in this area by the specific provisions of Article 54 and 68. 
132 See Anon., Conditions of Employment 182. 
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of the pittance which constitutes working pay.13S The French delegate 
at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference raised the point and suggested that 
disabled prisoners of war should receive the Detaining Power's na-
tional rate of disability compensation as long as they remained dis-
abled and prisoners of war.134 Perhaps he was seeking too much-
but, in any event, no action was taken on his suggestion and the pris-
oner of war disabled in an industrial accident or by an industrial 
disease will be at the mercy of the Detaining Power in this regard.131S 
5. Grievance Procedures 
In general, any prisoner of war who believes that the right guaran-
teed to him by the various provisions of the 1949 Convention are, in 
any manner whatsoever, being violated in connection with his uti-
lization as a source of labor, would have the right to avail himself 
of any of the channels of complaint established by the Convention: 
the representatives of the Protecting Power, the prisoners' represen-
tative, or, perhaps, the representatives of the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross.136 Nevertheless, the 1949 Diplomatic Conference 
felt it advisable to include in the second paragraph of Article 50, fol- . 
lowing the listing of the classes of authorized labor, a specific provision 
permitting prisoners of war to exercise their right of complaint should 
they consider that a particular work assignment is in a prohibited 
area.137 It is somewhat difficult to perceive the necessity for this pro-
vision, or that it adds anything to the general protection otherwise 
accorded to the prisoner of war by the appropriate provisions of the 
Convention. In fact, the danger always exists that by specific provi-
sions such as this the draftsmen may have unwittingly diluted the 
effect of the general protective provisions of this nature in areas 
where no specific provisions have been included. 
6. Special Agreements 
It would not be appropriate to leave the discussion of the utilization 
of prisoner-of-war labor without at least passing reference to the pos-
sibility of special agreements in this field between the opposing bellig-
erents. Strangely enough, despite the fact that prisoner-of-war labor 
has been the subject of many special agreements, or of attempts to 
133 During World War II the United States paid prisoners of war injured in 
industrial accidents one-half (40 cents) of the regular work payments during the 
period of disability. Tollefson, Enemy Prisoners of War 61; Rich, Brief History 
433. 
134 2A Final Record 275-76. 
135 It should be noted that under Article 114 prisoners of war who are injured 
in accidents are eligible for early repatriation under the provisions of Article 109-
117, inclusive, of the Convention. See p. 412 infra. 
136 For a discussion of complaints by prisoners of war, see pp. 285 and 301-302 
infra. 
137 For examples of prisoner-of-war complaints on this subject during World 
War II, see text in connection with note Ii-275 supra. 
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negotiate special agreements, between opposing belligerents during 
both World War I and World War H,138 and despite numerous specific 
references elsewhere in the 1949 Convention to the possibility of spe-
cial agreements, nowhere in the articles of the 1949 Convention con-
cerned with prisoner-of-war labor is there any reference made to this 
subject. Nevertheless, such agreements, provided they do not ad-
versely affect the rights elsewhere in the Convention guaranteed to 
prisoners of war, may be negotiated under the provisions of the first 
paragraph of Article 6 of the Convention, as well as under the inher-
ent sovereign powers of the belligerents.139 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
Utilization of prisoner-of-war labor means increased availability of 
manpower and a reduction in disciplinary problems for the Detaining 
Power, and an active occupation, better health and morale, and, per-
haps, additional purchasing power for the prisoners of war. It is 
obvious that both sides have much to gain if all of the belligerents 
comply with the labor provisions of the 1949 Convention. 
On the whole, it is believed that these labor provisions represent an 
improvement in the protection to be accorded prisoners of war in any 
future major international armed conflict. True, they contain ambi-
guities and compromises which can serve any belligerent which is so 
minded as a basis for justifying the establishment of policies which 
are contrary to the best interests of the prisoners of war detained by 
it and which are probably contrary to the intent of the drafters. How-
ever, if the Convention is to be at all meaningful, it is necessary to 
start from the premise that the nations which are Parties to it will, 
to the maximum extent of their capabilities, implement it as the hu-
manitarian charter which it was intended to be. And in any event, 
two factors are always present which tend to call forth this type of 
implementation: the presence of the Protecting Power and the doc-
trine of reciprocity.140 Information as to the manner of interpreting 
and implementing the provisions of the Convention by a belligerent is 
made known to the other side through the activities of the Protecting 
Power and thus can become public knowledge, with the resulting effect, 
good or bad, on world public opinion.141 Policies which, while perhaps 
complying with a strict interpretation of the provisions of the Conven-
138 See, e.g., the World War 1 agreements listed in note 1-39 supra; and the 
World War II agreements discussed in Lauterpacht, Problem 373. 
130 Concerning special agreements between belligerents, see pp. 84-86 supra. 
By becoming Parties to the Convention they have given up their sovereign right 
to enter into special agreements adversely affecting the rights guaranteed to 
prisoners of war by the Convention. 
140 The activities of humanitarian organizations such as the lCRC are likewise 
a major deterrent to the improper application of the Convention. 
141 Concerning the effect of world public opinion, see p. 33 supra. 
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tion, are obviously overly restrictive in an area where a more human~ 
itarian attitude appears justified, and could easily be employed, will 
undoubtedly result in the adoption of an equally or even more restric~ 
tive policy by the opposing belligerent. Such retorsion can easily lead 
to charges of reprisals, which are outlawed, and thus create a situa~ 
tion which, whether or not justified, can result only in harm to all of 
the prisoners of war held by both sides. While there were nations 
which, during World War II, appeared to be disinterested in the effect 
that their treatment of prisoners of war was having on the treatment 
being received by their own personnel detained by the enemy, it is to 
be hoped that in any future international armed conflict, even one 
which represents the " ... destruction of an ideology ... ,"142 at the 
very least, concern for the fate of its own per~onneI will cause each 
belligerent to comply fully with the labor provisions of the 1949 Con~ 
vention. 
142 Statement of German General Keitel, quoted in I.M.T. 475. 
